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LECTURE
NO EXIT?: OPTING OUT, THE CONTRACTUAL
THEORY OF THE CORPORATION, AND THE

SPECIAL CASE OF REMEDIES
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Aloof and insular as corporate law often seems, it cannot
remain uninfluenced for very long by developments in the mainstream of American civil law. In that mainstream, there is today
flowing a strong, swift current called "tort reform."' As currents
go, this one is remarkably broad and perhaps a little shallow,
but on it floats a number of diverse legislative proposals - ceilings on liability, restrictions on attorneys' fees, greater reliance
on alternative methods of dispute resolution, restrictions on
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School The author
wishes to acknowledge helpful comments from Professors Victor Brudney, Merritt Fox,
Ronald Gilson and Richard Shell, as well as from the Pomerantz panelist& The Honorable Stanley Sporkin, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia and the
Honorable Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commision. Because the author is serving as Reporter to the American Law Institute for the Remedie3
Section (Part VII) of its Principlesof CorporateGovernance:Analysis and Recommendations, it should be understood that this article represents only the authores position
and is not intended to express the views of the ALI or his fellow Reporters.
' The recent report of the American Bar Association's (ABA) "McKay Commis ion"
provides a balanced overview of developments in this area. See American Bar A&-ocation, Report of the Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System (1987). See
also Shipp, ABA Split Over Proposalsto Revise Tort System, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,1987,
at 12, col 3 (discussing the more disputed proposals in the Commission's Report).
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joint and several liability and contribution, and the curtailment
of punitive damages.2 All of these proposals flow from the same
wellspring: a broad public perception that there is today a liability crisis, which has increased the volume of litigation, dried up
the availability of liability insurance, and exposed many to the
threat of bankrupting litigation. The accuracy of this perception
of a liability crisis is open to serious question,3 but is largely beyond the scope of this article - in part, because the perception
itself may be the important phenomenon, one that can become
self-fulfilling.
This public perception of a liability crisis has already begun
to influence the development of American corporate law. By one
recent tabulation, over half the states have enacted legislation
since 1986 to shield corporate directors from liability for breach
of the duty of care.4 Although several different approaches have
been used to shelter corporate officials, the most popular reform
has been a form of statute, first enacted by Delaware, that authorizes shareholders to adopt a charter provision that "opts
2

For example, a series of recent Supreme Court decisions seem to have the one

common denominator that the plaintiff's attorney always loses. See Evans v. Jeff D., 106
S. Ct. 1531 (1986) (upholding fee waiver as a condition of settlement); Marek v. Chesny,
473 U.S. 1 (1985) (expanding scope of Rule 68 to deny fee award for post-settlement
offer efforts where outcome less favorable than settlement offer); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 106 S. Ct. 3078 (1986) (denying multiplier or bonus in fee
award determination for special skill or success of attorney), modified on reh'g, 107 S.
Ct. 3078 (1987) (denying risk multiplier to plaintiff's attorney).
The American Law Institute (ALI) has begun several projects to consider alternative
approaches to mass tort class actions. For their first effort, see ALI, Preliminary Study
of Complex Litigation (Draft Report for Council, December 1, 1986). The Reagan Administration has also endorsed proposals to reduce both jury awards and plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. See Pear, Administration Submits Plan To Reduce Damage Awards, N.Y.
Times, May 1, 1986, at B9, col. 1.
I See, e.g., Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.LA L. REV. 4 (1983) (suggesting that the flurry of contemporary litigation
should be viewed in light of evolving social conditions).
' See INVESTMENT RESPONSImLITY RESEARCH CENTER, MORE THAN HALF OF THE
STATES OFFER DIRECTOR LIABILITY PROTECTION, 4 IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN No. 5, at 155 (Sept./Oct. 1987). Interestingly, the rapidity with which 27 states have
enacted legislation in little over a year is probably the most telling argument against a
broader right to opt out of the normal rules of corporate governance, because it suggests
that there is little barrier to changing those rules, given the competitive market for corporate charters. However, I think the case of director liability statutes is unique and
largely a response to a perceived sudden crisis surrounding the availability of liability
insurance. Other possible private ordering variations will not affect as many corporations
and so will not elicit the same legislative stampede.
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out" from the common law's rules on due care liability.5 This
idea that shareholders can contract out from the common law
and adopt a different regulatory regime derives in turn from an
increasingly important academic perspective on corporate law popularly known as the "contractarian" theory of the corporation - which sees state-enabling statutes as simply providing a
model form contract (in effect a statutory Blumberg's form)
from which shareholders may deviate as they choose.' This Article will focus on the confluence of these two trends: the movement toward "tort reform" and the growing acceptance of the
contractarian theory of the corporation.
At this confluence, a third trend toward "tort reform" has
begun to gather momentum, but has not yet reached the corporate field: the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement.7 Predictably, this movement will also intersect with the
contractarian view of the corporation because proponents of
ADR (or at least those who like the outcomes it produces) will
favor charter provisions under which most intra-corporate disputes would be handled by arbitration, thus denying a plaintiff
access to the courts through a derivative action.8 Can a corpora-

" See DFL.CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1987) (authorizing provision
that eliminates or reduces personal liability of a director to the corporation for a breach
of the duty of care). See also note 10 infra. Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and South Dakota have followed this charter option format, as has New York, see note 4 supra.S.B. 26 (1987) (amending KAN STAT. ANN. § 176002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B § 13(b) (1.5) (Law. Co-op. 1987); 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts
§ 1 (amending MicH. Comp. LAws § 450.1209); MINN. STATS. § 302A.251(4) (1986); 1987
N.J.P. ch. 35, (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2.7); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8364 (Purdon 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8 (1987); Hanks, State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability Crisis, Rv.oF SEC. & Coi.lm REG. (Feb. 11, 1987), at
23, 24. In contrast, Indiana has modified the substantive duty of care by statutorily restricting damages for its breach so that a director is liable for failing to comply with the
statutory standard only if "the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness." See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Burns Supp. 1986).
6 For a representative statement of the contractarian perspective, see R. POSN.ER.
ECONOLUc ANALysis OF LAW 369-72 (3d ed. 1986). See also notes 27-35 and accompanying
text infra.
7For the bible of this new movement, see S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER.
DisPrur RESOLUTION (1985). For an effective critique of some of its many underexamined
premises, see Merry, Disputing Without Culture (Book Review), 100 HARv.L. Ray. 2057
(1987).
a Rash as this prediction may have seemed when I made it at the Pomerantz Lecture, it has already been fulfilled. The Center for Public Resources, a New York-based
organization dedicated to alternative dispute resolution, has begun to draft a model proposaL Franklin, Courthouse Closed?: Required Mediation of Shareholder Suits
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tion do this? Two recent Supreme Court decisions, which this
Article will examine, now makes this at least a plausible
scenario.'
The common denominator in these recent trends in tort reform - i.e., the elimination of liability for due care violations,
and the possible substitution of arbitration for the derivative action - is that the legitimacy of each rests upon the view we take
of private ordering. How deferential should a court be to a charter amendment approved by widely dispersed shareholders of a
public corporation? Of course, when the specific charter provision has been clearly authorized by the legislature, little doubt
exists about the validity of this type of contracting out from the
common law. 10 Here, the legislature clearly has made the common law norm a default rule from which shareholders are free to
opt out.
But what if there is no such legislative statement? Interestingly, the recent Delaware statute that is the prototype for this
wave of legislation appears to have borrowed its charter amendment technique from the American Law Institute's (ALI) Corporate Governance Project, which had published an earlier Discus-

Weighed, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1987, at 5, col. 2.
9 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Perry v.
Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987). These cases are discussed in the text accompanying
notes 63-67 infra.
10 Some recent decisions have invalidated ceilings on liability in other contexts on
seventh amendment grounds. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 788-89 (W.D.
Va. 1986) (invalidating ceiling on medical malpractice liability). This issue is beyond the
scope of this article, and in any event would only change the kind of opting out device
that would be used, because the duty of care can itself clearly be constitutionally modified or abolished. Although the validity of the Delaware statute is not in serious doubt,
its construction may be.
DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 102(b)(7) contains several ambiguous exceptions. It
authorizes:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provisions shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law,
(iii) under section 174 of this Title, or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to
the date when such provision becomes effective. All references in this subsection to a director shall also be deemed to refer to a member of the governing
body of a corporation which is not authorized to issue capital stock.
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sion Draft that concluded that a majority of the shareholders
could reduce, but not eliminate, financial liability for due care
violations through charter provisions.11 Thus, the ALI draft goes
further than Delaware in one important respect: It would permit
shareholders, even in the absence of specific statutory authority,
to deviate from the common law's standards through charter
amendments, at least to the limited extent of placing a ceiling
on the financial liability of officers and directors for what might
loosely be termed ordinary negligence.
Yet, if shareholders have this power to adopt such "freestanding" departures from the common law not clearly authorized by statute, the slope obviously becomes slippery as to where
this power stops. Indeed, the question arises: Why can't they
also adopt charter amendments that abolish all forms of liability, including that for the duty of loyalty, or charter provisions
that expressly permit corporate officials to engage in insider
trading or to usurp corporate opportunities? 2 Some would answer this question by saying that shareholders are too rational to
ratify such amendments; hence, there need be no limits on their
authority. Others who doubt the efficacy of shareholder voting
believe that shareholders will ratify almost anything placed
before them in a proxy statement; they then would reject any
departures from the common law not authorized by statute. The
arguments on both sides of this question need not be restated
here, but the more interesting question is whether there is any
"' Delaware amended its statute on July 1, 1986 to add subsection (b)(7) to section
102. The ALI's proposed charter limitation provision was first set forth in a printed,
widely circulated document in Discussion Draft No. 1, published in 1935. A later typewritten version of the current version of section 7.17 was made available to the Corporate
Laws Committee of the Delaware State Bar Association that drafted subsection
102(b)(7). See note 15 infra. Although it is always speculative to infer what precedents
persuaded a committee, members of that committee have informed this author that they
were influenced by the ALI proposal and that they had previously been discusing
changes in Delaware's indemnification statute in order to "shield" directors from the
impact of Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (DeL 1985). The ALI Discussion Draft
appears to have been the only policy proposal seeking reduction in directors' due care
liability that antedates the decision in Smith v. Van Gorhum.
Is Some commentators would wholly privatize the law of insider trading and allow
corporations to license such trading by officers in their stock. See Macey, From Fairness
to Contact: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HoFrTRA L
Rxv. 9, 39-47 (1984). As this article will explain, I strongly disapprove of such charter
provisions and believe they should not be upheld, because of the unproductive uncertainty they create.
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coherent intermediate position. Can we find criteria by which to
define a boundary line, separating those areas where contracting
out from the common law's basic norms should be permitted,
even in the absence of specific authorizing legislation, from those
components of corporate law that should be viewed as
mandatory in character?
This article will suggest that at least a partial answer to this
question can be found by taking the idea of the corporation as a
contract more seriously than have the contractarian theorists,
who tend to have a highly reified idea of contract. To do so requires that we examine actual contract law, where courts have
developed a number of doctrines by which to restrict opportunistic behavior by those who propose a contractual modification.13 If we are looking for standards by which to judge charter
amendments that seek to opt out of the normal rules of corporate governance or fiduciary duties, this body of law limiting
contractual modifications supplies, I believe, a better guiding
analogy than do vaguer references to the murky law on unconscionability or contracts of adhesion. In both the case of the contractual modification and the charter amendment, an ambiguous
or not clearly understood term may permit the party who proposed the modification or amendment to behave in a manner
that is inconsistent with the expectations of the other party or
shareholders. Contract law has responded to this problem by developing equitable limitations that look to whether the risks addressed by the modification had been earlier allocated or
whether instead they were new and unforseen. 4 If corporate law
is to follow contract law, this analogy suggests that attempts to
opt out from the "default" rules of corporate governance look
very different (and more suspicious) if they occur at midstream
(and are to be effected by charter amendment) than if such opting out occurs at the formation of the firm. Other analogies to
existing contract law, in particular Uniform Commercial Code
section 2-719, suggest that courts should not simply defer to a
charter amendment that opts out, but should ask if hypothetical

"sFor an illuminating

overview of the rationale for restricting contractual modifica-

tions, see Muris, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts,65 MINN. L. Rav. 521

(1981). Professor Muris chiefly focuses on certain implicit terms (such as a good faith
requirement) that courts often discover in contracts and argues that these terms are really intended to deter opportunism by the party who proposes the modification.
1

See notes 40-41 infra.
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bargainers could sensibly reach such an arrangement. Such a focus on hypothetical bargaining is very different from either total
deference or hostility to opting out.
Because general concepts are best introduced with specific
illustrations, this article will use two specific proposals - section 7.17 of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance and
the proposed substitution of an arbitration remedy for the derivative action - as stalking horses by which to approach the
larger issues of private ordering and opting out in the context of
the public corporation. To be sure, limitations on due care liability are a far easier "reform" for most to accept than the possible
substitution of arbitration (or other alternative means of dispute
resolution) for judicial remedies. This latter case forces us to examine from a more skeptical angle how prepared we are to permit opting out and, more generally, the degree to which we consider corporate law to be only enabling in character.
I. SECTION 7.17: DUE CARE AND "ExcEssrv

DETERRENCE"

Section 7.17 of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations essentially provides that
shareholders may adopt, and courts should give effect to, a charter provision limiting the liability of corporate officers and directors for certain violations of the duty of care. 5 When applicable,
15 ALI, Principlesof Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.17
(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987) [hereinafter ALI Draft]. The section reads as follo
Limitation on Damages for Certain Violations of the Duty of Care
(a) If a failure by a director [§1.08] or an officer [§1.22] to meet the standard of conduct specified in § 4.01 did not
(1) involve a knowing and culpable violation of law by the director or officer-, or
(2) enable the director or officer, or an associate [§ 1.02], to receive a benefit that was improper under Part V; or
(3) show a conscious disregard for the duty of the director or officer to the
corporation under circumstances in which the director or officer was aware that
his conduct or omission created an unjustified risk of serious injury to the corporation; or
(4) constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that
amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation,
damages for the violation should be limited to an amount that is not disproportionate to the compensation received by the director or officer for serving
the corporation during the year of the violation.
(b) A limitation on damages complying with § 7.17(a) may be implemented by
(1) an enabling statute that authorizes the inclusion of a limitation on
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section 7.17 permits liability to be reduced to a floor set at the
compensation the defendant receives from the corporation during the year (or years) of the violation. Thus, if a director receives $20,000 in fees for performing his duties as a director, this
amount will also represent his maximum liability for a "simple"
due care violation, even if the actual damages proximately
caused by the violation of the duty of due care were $10,000,000.
In effect, section 7.17 allows the shareholders to substitute a different and far more modest measure of damages for the traditional tort measure of damages (i.e., all damages proximately
caused by the tort), which in the past the common law has used
in derivative actions.1 In this light, it addresses the adjectival
law (the measure of damages) more than the substantive law
(the nature of the duty).
However, section 7.17 does address the nature of the duty,
because it carves out some violations of the duty of care as to
which its ceiling does not apply. Specifically, clauses (a)(1)
through (a)(4) of section 7.17 identify certain more egregious violations as to which no exculpation or mitigation of damages is
authorized.1 7 As a result, if section 7.17 were to be accepted by
courts, it would reflect both a partial recognition that common
law rules may sometimes be modified through private ordering
and at the same time a statement that there must be limits on
this ability to "contract out." Still, even if section 7.17 does then
reflect a specific instance of an intermediate position, how can
we generalize its conclusion that there are both permissible and

damages in a corporation's certificate of incorporation; or
(2) a provision in a certificate of incorporation that is adopted by a vote of
disinterested shareholders [§1.11] after appropriate disclosure concerning the
provision.
(c) Any limitation on damages set forth in the corporation's certificate of
incorporation
(1) should require ratification by shareholder vote at periodic intervals
and, in the case of a provision not expressly authorized by statute, be subject
to repeal by shareholders at the annual meeting; and
(2) should not reduce liability with respect to pending actions or losses
incurred prior to its adoption.

Id.
Is See, e.g., Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969); Sutton v. Reagan
& Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 835 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).
17 See note 15, supra.It should be noted that these exclusions roughly parallel DEL.
GEN. CoRP. LAW. § 102(b)(7), but are somewhat narrower and more precise in their coverage. For a discussion of the differences, see ALI Draft, supra note 15, at 43-46.
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impermissible deviations from the common law?

On the simplest level, the prevailing law is that shareholders
can adopt any provision in the certificate of incorporation that is
not against public policy.18 This statement is tautological and
leads only to a further question: How do we determine when a
particular provision exceeds the boundaries of public policy? Arguably, if financial liability is reduced or eliminated, the incentive to comply with the duty of care would decrease. Conversely,
there are obvious justifications for a ceiling on due care liability,
which suggest that efficiency gains can be realized by contracting
out from the common law. Briefly, five distinct policy justifications can be advanced for the position reached in section 7.17.
First, there is the danger that excessive exposure to liability
whether that exposure is real or only perceived -

will cause

directors to flee the board. This danger has been pointed to
many times in the past, but only recently has there been any
empirical evidence to corroborate it. In 1985, the percentage of
outside directors on the boards of the one thousand largest industrial corporations dropped from 63.2% to 57.5%, according
to Heidrick & Struggles.1" This was the first decline in this figure since 1966, the year Heidrick & Struggles first began tabulating board composition. Similarly, a recent study by Korn/
Ferry International found that 20% of all corporations surveyed
had been turned down by a prospective director; many had been
rejected more than once.20 Although different scenarios may explain what caused this vector change in board composition, one
cannot be indifferent to it, unless one takes the doctrinaire view
that board composition is irrelevant because outside directors
are either ineffectual or usually subject to disabling conflicts of
interest.21
18

Compare Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952)
(stockholders may agree to a charter provision which permits interested directors to be
counted towards a quorum) with Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D.
Colo. 1972) (exculpatory charter provisions may limit liability of interested directors but
may not be interpreted as a license to steal). The line between the two cases appears to
involve the potential for fraud.
"ISee Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. W&, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56-57.
'0 See Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1987, at 1, col 5.
21 Some commentators doubt that the outside director plays more than a symbolic
role that legitimates the exercise of managerial power. See Brudney, The Independent
Director- Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARv. L. REv. 597 (1982). See also H.
GENEEN, MANAGING 250-61 (1984) (doubting that outside directors play any significant
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Second, there is a fairness argument: the duty of care imposes broad monitoring responsibilities upon directors and, although the law protects corporate officials by according them
the generally ample protections of the business judgment rule,
that doctrine contains a hidden reef - unless the director has
informed himself adequately with respect to the matter at issue,
the business judgment rule does not, in its standard formulation,
apply.2 2 Because ill-advised economic decisions (whether to expand production, increase debt, undertake acquisitions, restructure the firm, build the Edsel or make substantial loans to Brazil) can produce astronomic losses, there is a curious irony here
that the duty of care, if violated, will typically yield much higher
damages than the duty of loyalty. Yet, in the due care case, the
culpability of the actor is much lower; negligence is certainly
considerably less reprehensible than predatory self-dealing or
fraud. When the level of damages does not correspond even
roughly to the actor's level of culpability, intuitive notions of
fairness tell us that something is wrong. This is doubly so when
the law in this area has little compensatory role to perform (as I
would assert that it does not in this area, given the high transaction costs associated with derivative litigation).
Simply put, shareholders do not look to directors' pockets
as a source from which to recover economic losses, nor do directors accept any role as insurers when they come on the board.
Moreover, the equation between the shareholder and the traditional tort victim breaks down even further when we look at the
plaintiff's side of the equation: shareholders typically hold diversified portfolios, while the tort victims of medical malpractice
cannot similarly diversify away their risks. Thus, the standard
tort analysis fails to provide an appropriate analogy both because (1) the corporate director is not an entrepreneur who incorporates into the price he charges some premium for the risk
he assumes, and (2) the shareholder-plaintiff is unlike the typical tort plaintiff whose injuries cannot be mitigated through diversification. In this light, deterrent, not compensatory, objecrole under current board structures). Although I agree that information overload and
other constraints place realistic limits on what independent directors can accomplish, I
find this view too cynical.
22 For the classic statement of this procedural requirement to the invocation of the
business judgment rule, see Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1944).
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tives should underlie the duty of care, and they can be satisfied
by damages far below the level that the standard tort measure
permits.
A third justification underlying section 7.17 begins from the
standard nullification thesis that is well known to students of
the criminal law. Just as the English jury of the eighteenth century was believed to be reluctant to convict the poacher, even
when he was caught in the act, because it considered the penalty
(typically, capital punishment) too severe for the crime, so also
are courts likely to distort the substantive law of the duty of
care if they believe the penalties are disproportionate.23 From
this premise, it follows that the awarding of more modest damages might result in the substantive duty being enforced more
evenly and effectively. Today, judicial opinions concerning the
duty of care frequently display a disingenuous quality, as the
court first announces a high standard of expected performance
but then finds some ad hoc reason to justify dismissal.
A fourth reason grows out of the current liability insurance
crisis.24 One way to view section 7.17 is as an attempt to restore
an equilibrium. In the recent past, whatever their theoretical exposure, directors relied on their insurance policies, which effectively reduced their liability to the policy's minimum deductible
(and any co-insurance provision). Today, if insurance is not
available, or if the exceptions to the policy seem to overwhelm
its coverage, a charter provision reducing due care liability to
the director's fees roughly reinstates the prior status quo. In effect, directors are not substantially more, or less, exposed to loss
than in the recent past, but the cost of insurance is saved. Ar23 For a brief discussion of this nullification hypothesis,'ee ALI Draft1 supra note

15, at 31, 57. In this light, it is relevant that directors of publicly held corporations receive relatively modest fees in proportion to their overall income and wealth. According
to a 1983 survey by Arthur Young & Co., the average compensation, including fees for
attending meetings, received by directors of publicly held firms was $14,230. See ARThtuR
YOUNG & CO., ORGANIZATION AND COMPENSATION OF BoARD OF DiRECrons, at 27 (Table
20). This figure rises to $34,300 for directors of companies with annual revenues exceeding $5 billion. See KornlFerryInternationalAnnual Survey, Wall St. J., June 14, 1985,
at 7, col. 1.
2 In the wake of several large payouts by insurers, the insurance industry dramatically increased premiums on "D&O" insurance in 1985. One survey found that "D&O"
premiums rose on average 362% during 1985. See Table, KornlFerryInternational,Wall
St. J., Mar. 21, 1986, at 31, col. 3. See also Hilder, Liability Insurance Is Difficult to
FindNow ForDirectors, Officers, Wall. St. J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6; Lewin, Director
Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at D1, coL 3.
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guably, section 7.17 then restores only the former equilibrium,
while in contrast those recent statutes that permit the total
elimination of liability place the board's directors in a better position than they were in before the recent liability insurance crisis. In this light, there is something intellectually dishonest
about using the liability insurance crisis to make the insured
better off than if he had low cost insurance. At most, this crisis
justifies an equitable intervention intended to restore the prior
status quo.
A final justification for section 7.17 is that it suffices to meet
the law's real objective in the due care area, namely, an adequate deterrent threat. In the case of the corporate officer, the
measure of liability - one year's salary - is likely to be a significant percentage of the realistic net worth of most corporate
officials. In the case of the director, the measure of one year's
director's fees does not amount to the same threat, but the exceptions set forth in section 7.17 deny the availability of the ceiling when the director's conduct falls within them. As a result, a
director is given only an expanded margin for error, not immunity for egregious misbehavior. In any real world setting, a director will remain conscious of the litigation risk that his conduct,
viewed retrospectively by a possibly unsympathetic fact-finder,
may seem to fall within the exclusions set forth in section 7.17
(in particular, either the "recklessness" exception in section
7.17(a)(3) or the "abdication" exception of section 7.17(a)(4)).
To be sure, this same point can be made about the Delaware
statute2 5 and other similar recent statutes, because their "good
faith" requirement creates a similar litigation risk that defendants must discount. The result is that deterrence remains because even a small litigation risk of high financial liability
should be adequate to deter most forms of shirking. Perhaps the
best parallel here is the impact of the scienter requirement imposed by the Supreme Court for Rule 10b-5 actions in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder.26 Although the change from negligence to
scienter undoubtedly made a difference and tilted the litigation

" See notes 10 & 11 supra.
425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (requiring proof of scienter, rather than negligence, to
support an action under Rule 10b-5). This decision left open, however, whether proof of
26

"recklessness" would suffice to show scienter, but subsequent decisions have found such
proof to be sufficient.
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balance in favor of the defendant, experienced plaintiffs' attorneys quickly found imaginative ways by which to plead scienter.
The net result was to reduce the settlement value of Rule 10b-5
litigation, but not to spell its demise. Similarly, duty of care litigation may be chilled by section 7.17, but not eliminated, as the
real impact is to force plaintiffs to settle on the basis of their
ability to prove "recklessness" or some other exception to section 7.17's modest ceiling.
In terms of public policy, the central issue then is: How
much deterrence is needled? Any sensible answer depends on
what we expect directors to do. If a realistic view is that directors should serve as monitors and not as the actual decisionmakers, then focusing deterrence, as section 7.17 does, on conscious indifference, abdication, and illegality seems to me to correspond to this monitoring model of the director's role.
Having stated these justifications for a ceiling on damages,
let me now distance myself from them. My claim is not that the
foregoing arguments are clearly superior to all the possible
counter-arguments. Indeed, if the common law rule were as bad
as the foregoing discussion suggests, over time courts probably
would either modify the rule or develop collateral doctrines (e.g.,
restrictive procedural rules or affirmative defenses) that weaken
it. But this would take time. During this interim, the case for
private ordering is that the parties can recognize their own selfinterest more quickly than the courts. That there are defects in
the private ordering process (as Professor Brudney properly
points out) does not mean that there are not also strengths. If
so, why should private ordering be wholly dependent in this context on express legislative authority for departures from the
common law? This claim may sound so modest and uncontroversial as to approach the trivial. Yet, before we defer uncritically
to the norm of private ordering, we must ask what distinguishes
this deviation from the common law from other, more dubious
departures - for example, a charter amendment authorizing insider trading by corporate officials as a form of managerial compensation. The real challenge then may be to articulate why opting out should not always be permissible.
II.

PERSPECTIVES
BARGAINING

ON

THE

CORPORATION:

PRICING

VERSUS

Let me approach the central problem of line drawing in the
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time honored way of all law professors by first sketching two polar positions and then offering my own "reasonable" intermediate compromise. This tactic of preempting the middle ground
also allows me to juxtapose two basic perspectives on corporate
law that have many adherents but that are in my judgment ultimately unsatisfactory.
A.

The ContractarianPerspective

The first perspective, which I will term the contractarian
perspective, has been most forcefully advanced in a series of articles by Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel. In their view:
The code of corporate law is a standard form contract for issues of

corporate structure. To the extent [that legal rules] anticipate the
desires of the contracting parties, these off-the-rack principles reduce

the number of items to be negotiated and the costs of negotiating
them.2"

In short, corporate legal rules exist, it seems, simply to reduce
transaction costs. Corporate law offers a model form contract;
shareholders are free to buy "off-the-rack," as it were, at J.C.
Penney's or to pay more for individualized tailoring at Brooks
Brothers. From this perspective, statutory corporate law can be
seen as only a set of "default" rules that fill in the void where
the parties have not chosen to write their own contract in more
detail. In this light, it is unsurprising that Judge Easterbrook
challenged the Reporters at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the
American Law Institute to permit such contracting-out explicitly.28 Except in a few limited areas, such as section 7.17 and the
corporate opportunity doctrine, where we do permit shareholder
action to reduce the scope of the legal obligation that would otherwise exist,29 we have largely declined his invitation. While I do

27

Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. OF L. & EcON. 395, 401

(1983).
2" See ALI, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 63RD ANNUAL MEETING 412-13 (1987). Judge Easterbrook argued that portions of the duty of loyalty could be made inapplicable to a
specific corporation's officers and directors by a shareholder vote. After an extended discussion of this contractarian view of fiduciary duties, a motion was made and passed to
refer the discussion to the Reporters for further study.
29 See ALI Draft, supra note 15, § 5.09 (permitting, for example, disinterested directors or shareholders to approve a "standard of the corporation," which term includes a
bylaw, under which certain transactions "that could be expected to recur in the ordinary
course of business of the corporation" may be entered into without specific board or
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not speak for my fellow Reporters, I would consider this article
to be my reply.
B. The Consensualist'sPosition
Some commentators reject the contractarian perspective as
oversimplified - in effect, an interesting intellectual thought experiment that has few empirical referents in the real world of
complex institutional structures and high transaction costs.
Probably the most articulate of these critics has been Professor
Victor Brudney who, in a 1985 article in the Columbia Law Review, dismissed the claim that private bargaining can restrain
management self-dealing and shirking as mere "rhetoric. ' O
Strong echoes of Berle and Means can be clearly heard in his
analysis: stockholders are too dispersed to take effective coordinated action; they lack the requisite information and the necessary institutional mechanisms to bargain effectively; outside directors are too compromised and insufficiently motivated to be
effective monitors. In short, the relationship between investors
and managers within the large firm is not governed by anything
resembling a market, and it "stretches the concept of 'contract'
beyond recognition to use it to describe either the process of
bargaining or the arrangements between investors of publicly
held corporations and either' theoretical owners first going public
or corporate management."' 3
If the notion of contract is, at bottom, grounded on the bargain principle, Professor Brudney seems to me to be correct in
concluding that the corporate charter should not be analogized
to a contract because there is little opportunity for individualized bargaining between investors and managers. Even most
contractarians would concede this, but their reply brings us to
the nub of the matter. Contractarians acknowledge that investors never negotiated the terms of the corporate contract with
managers, but they answer that the market nonetheless "priced"
those terms. Investors' consent to those terms is then implicit in

shareholder approval). In effect, this provision authorizes a limited amount of self-deal.
ing as to which specific board approval is not required if the transaction is authorized
generally by such a "standard of the corporation."
-o Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLuBL L REV. 1403, 1410 (1985).
11 Id. at 1412.
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their decision to purchase the stock at the market price. Unfairness, they would argue, only results when the investor pays for
something that he does not get; thus, so long as there is disclosure of what the investor is not getting, no unfairness can result.
Professor Brudney will have none of this. He dismisses this
use of market terminology stating, "[T]his reference to the market appears to suggest that in some metaphorical sense aggregate decisions by investors over time embody a mechanism for
implementing free and informed individual choice." 32 Here,
then, is the core dispute: one side demands individual consent,
which can only be demonstrated by actual give-and-take bargaining; the other considers the market and its pricing mechanism as an adequate surrogate for individual bargaining.
Note, however, that from either perspective, section 7.17
seems objectionable. To a contractarian, it seems inconsistent to
allow some contracting out from the common law's standards
but then to place boundaries on the permissible range of such
departures. Section 7.17 clearly does this because it permits
shareholders to reduce liability only to a minimum level equal to
the corporate official's fees or salary, but not to eliminate all liability for a simple due care violation (as Delaware now permits).
It also specifies in some detail certain varieties of misconduct for
which there may be no reduction of liability. To contractarians,
these restrictions offend their sense that the corporate charter is
simply a private contract among consenting adults. Conversely,
to the consensualists, section 7.17 seems even more deplorable
because it arguably trivializes a fiduciary duty that numerous judicial decisions have addressed.33
As the Reporter thus caught in the crossfire between those
who say section 7.17 goes too far and those who say it does not
go far enough, I find the positions of both sides to be extreme.
Pricing is not the same as bargaining, but the consensualists
have not adequately explained why. In particular, I believe that
Professor Brudney has pointed to the wrong reasons for obId. at 1420.
11 Professor Brudney has described a predecessor version of section 7.17 as "apparently designed to assure directors. . . of substantial, if not total, freedom from any enforceable obligation to investors with respect to their inputs in conducting the enterprise." Id. at 1410 n.19. He suggests that the adoption of this provision was a retreat in
the face of the "intense campaign by the fuglemen of corporate management" (an apparent reference to the Business Roundtable). Id.
32
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jecting to pricing as a substitute for bargaining; the problem is
not that the decisions of shareholders cannot be analogized to
those of participants in a market (indeed, they can be), but that
all markets have their inherent weaknesses and characteristic reactions to the problem of quality uncertainty. Usually, these imperfections are described as problems of "imperfect information." Imperfect information is, however, a portmanteau concept
that needs to be unpacked. Shareholders may have an imperfect
understanding of the terms in the corporate charter, of the risks
that it allocates, of the differences between the charter terms
that various firms are offering, or of the likely impact that a difference in terms will have on managerial behavior (which behavior is, of course, also restrained to an uncertain extent by nonlegal forces, such as the need to preserve reputational capital).
Similar problems exist in many consumer markets, 3' but there is
an important distinction between the market for charters and
the markets for most consumer goods. This difference is essentially that the major risks are endogenous. That is, although the
consumer in the market for new cars may also have difficulty in
distinguishing the reputation for quality of many manufacturers,35 the consumer in the corporate securities markets must face
the problem that any material deviation in charter terms may
affect future managerial behavior. This consumer is not buying a
durable consumer good whose present quality he can ascertain if
he investigates fully, but a future stream of earnings that may
be diverted, wasted or misappropriated by managers who may
be able to exploit some special discretion that these terms give
them. In short, these risks are harder to foresee because they
depend on future contingencies and future management personnel. Information about these risks is not only more costly, it approaches the unknowable.
This claim that there is a unique kind of quality uncertainty
See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 V& L Rav. 1387 (1983).
5Of
course, it is arguable that opting out from any fiduciary duty or remedial provision "signals" that the firm intends to overreach the consumer (or shareholder) in exactly this area. This view that a warranty or a disclaimer of a warranty "signals" the
quality of a firm has been stated many times in the general commercial literature. See
Grossman, The InformationalRole of Warrantiesand PrivateDisclosureAbout Product
Quality, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 461, 470-77 (1981). But it is also possible that the firm is only
"signalling" its reservations (accurate or inaccurate) about the costs, accuracy, and error

rate of some legal remedies.
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concerning the market for corporate charters and that such special contractual provisions are more likely to change managerial
behavior does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that special
contracting is therefore illicit. The consensualists have not adequately recognized the costs of their position. If one says that
only individualized bargaining can suffice to justify a departure
from the common law, and if such individual bargaining is generally infeasible, this position may freeze the common law in
place and, thus, amounts to a prescription for stasis and
stalemate.
C. A Critique of the Contractarians
The usual criticisms of the contractarian position are that
high information costs and collective action problems render
shareholders "rationally apathetic."36 Although I agree that contractarians systematically tend to minimize these problems,
these criticisms take us only so far and do not necessarily justify
a prophylactic rule against all departures from the common law.
They need therefore to be supplemented by two other criticisms,
one legal and one economic.
My first criticism is that the contractarians have pushed
their private contract analogy too far because they have failed to
understand modern contract law, and in particular the legal restrictions on contractual provisions that limit remedies. They
thus have reified the concept of contract and not examined how
these doctrines are actually applied in most commercial contexts. My second and more general objection is that externalities
can arise from an unconstrained right to opt out - in particular,
a "lemons market" effect seems likely that should have an adverse impact on not only the shareholders of the subject company but on the market for corporate securities generally. Ultimately, these two criticisms dovetail and support a position
under which courts would uphold only those departures for
which a credible scenario can be presented explaining why rational shareholders would wish to depart from the common law's
norms.
"'
(1986).

For a concise discussion of these themes, see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-92
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1. Doctrinal Objections
One ironic generalization seems justified about those economists who view the firm as a private contract: they often seem to
ignore modern contract law in favor of an almost nineteenth
century, stereotypical notion of what contract law permits. In
fact, commercial law places some important boundaries on the
ability of parties to a contract to limit the remedies available for
its enforcement. Under the U.C.C. section 2-719, the parties may
agree on limitations or restrictions on remedies, or may provide
for substitute remedies, but only so long as the modified remedy
would not "fail of its essential purpose."3 Why does the U.C.C.
say this? Possibly, the answer is that the U.C.C. assumes that, in
this area, information costs are higher for the layperson. Or, it
may believe that if the parties have agreed upon an ineffective
or illusory remedy, one party has been overreached and the result is therefore "unconscionable." Alternatively, its premise
may be that there has been a mutual mistake or even a failure of
consideration. Whatever the rationale, the U.C.C. places important limits on the permissible range of "contracting out" from
its own remedies, even in this quintessential world of face-toface bargaining.
A fortiori, if one cannot agree to ineffective remedies in
face-to-face bargains, an analogy to contract law hardly supports
permitting the same to be done in the corporate context, where
transaction and information costs are higher and collective action problems confound bargaining. In this light, the U.C.C.'s
position that remedies may be modified by private arrangements, but not rendered illusory, furnishes an apt analogy for
what has been attempted in section 7.17. In essence, section 7.17
modifies the remedy for a breach of the duty of care, but the
justification for this modification is that the residual threat of
liability that it preserves does not permit the remedy to "fail of
its essential purpose." Of course, some may respond that the
U.C.C. § 2-719(2). Basically, the subject of remedies is uniquely singled out for
this protection against contractual overreaching. Although no equivalent statutory rule
restricts contractual provisions relating to the character, price, or quality of the goods
(except for the general and vague limitation on unconscionable contracts), U.C.C. section
2-316(1) does effectively restrict attempts to contract out from express warranties. This
rule forbidding disclaimers of express warranties is probably founded on concerns about
consumer confusion if the contract could seemingly give with one hand and take away
with the other. Uniquely, section 2-719 forbids even clear and unambiguous limitations.
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remedy, as so modified, now does fail of its essential purpose;
others may claim that the remedy would not fail even if all damages were abolished, but these are issues of application, not
rationale.
This analogy to the U.C.C. has its limits and arguably can
be outflanked, unless we recognize more generalized policies underlying the U.C.C.'s special rule that remedies may not be
emasculated. For example, what if a clever draftsman of the corporate charter were to seek not to change the remedy, but to
modify the substantive duty. That is, suppose a charter provision defines the duty of care not in terms of its typical objective
formulation (i.e., the standard of care that the "reasonable person in a like position would exercise"), but rather in terms of a
wholly subjective formulation (i.e., a duty to "act in good faith
and for a corporate purpose"). The new Virginia statute uses
just such a subjective standard. 8 Assume, for example, that the
charter amendment sought to abolish the corporate opportunity
doctrine, and no statute gave explicit authority for such a modification. At present, the case law indicates that any charter
amendment that directly conflicts with statutory law or a clearly
established common law rule will probably be invalidated as
against public policy. 9 But a convincing rationale for this public
policy barrier to contracting out has yet to be given in the face
of the new intellectual attack by the contractarians.
In my view, the best rationale for the public policy limitation should be the prospect of managerial opportunism. The risk
of such opportunism is greatest when the charter provision is
added by an amendment that shareholders do not fully under-

"s VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985) (defining director's duty of care in terms of "his
good faith business judgment of the best interest of the corporation"). This appears to be
an entirely subjective standard and thereby would eliminate liability for negligence that
was not accompanied by bad faith. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35(2) (Burns Supp. 1986)
("The breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness.").
" See, e.g., State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 A. 257
(1926); Abercombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956); Smith v. California
Thorn Cordage, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 93, 18 P.2d 393 (1933). But see Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952) (upholding deviations from common law
where no potential for fraud created). Note, however, that even in Sterling, which is a
more permissive decision than earlier cases, there is a focus on the potential for fraud
that parallels U.C.C. section 2-719's focus on the remedy's essential failure to serve the
intended purpose.
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stand. 40 To guard against contractual modifications that one
party is either coerced or tricked into accepting, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts imposes equitable limitations that
ask if the risk being responded to was within the reasonable anticipation of the parties at the time they originally entered into
the contract.41 Under such a test, one could arguably abolish the
corporate opportunity doctrine at the formation of the firm, but
not through a later charter amendment, unless it could be shown
that some risk or event was unanticipated that justifies the
change. Conversely, it is certainly arguable that charter provisions limiting due care liability are a response to unanticipated
events (or events that were only remotely foreseen), such as the
liability insurance crisis or new case law imposing stricter standards of due care liability. The U.C.C.'s limitations on remedy
modification can thus be seen as but a special sub-species of this
general rule limiting modifications.
2. Historical Objections
Historically, American corporate law has never regarded the
corporation as simply a private contract., 2 Although corporate
law has moved far from its original position, which saw corporations as quasi-public bodies, to become a largely enabling body
of law, most state statutes remain mandatory on at least a num4 0 See Muris, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts,65 him
. REv.
521 (1981) (viewing several well known doctrines of contract law as chiefly intended to
deter or prevent opportunistic modifications of contracts).
41 See RESTATmE NT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 89(D)(9) (modifications are valid if
"fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the
contract was made"). Comment (b) to this section then adds that "[t]he reason for modification must rest in circumstances not 'anticipated' as part of the context in which the
contract was made, but a frustrating event may be unanticipated... if it was not adequately covered, even though it was foreseen as a remote possibility." See also Muris,
supra note 40, at 538-39.
4 Some historical research by economists suggests that corporate law originally perceived the corporation to be purely a private contract. See Butler, General Incorporation
in Nineteenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative
Processes, 6 INTL REv. OF L & EcoN. 169, 170-71 (1986); Forbes, Limited Liability and
the Development of the Business Corporation,2 J. oF L EcON. & OnaG. 163 (1986).
Among professional historians, however, the private corporation in American history is
generally seen as having evolved from a quasi-public institution; indeed, until the early
1800's, little difference was recognized between private and municipal corporations. See
L F=Dx N, A HISTORY OF AMEmcAN LAw 188-95 (2d ed. 1985); H1 HuRsr. Tim LEammAcy oF THE BusINEss CORPORATION IN THE LAw OF mE UNiTED STATEs 1780-1970 (1970).
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ber of important points.43 Nor have recent statutory developments moved uniformly in the direction of a purely enabling
body of law."
Interestingly, judicial oversight appears to have been more
exacting precisely in those contexts where the individual owners

have been the most able to frame their own legal rules. Particularly in the case of the partnerships and close corporations,
courts seem to have been stricter in the enforcement of fiduciary
duties than in the case of publicly held corporations; transactions that would likely have been upheld in the case of publicly
held firms have been struck down in the case of closely held
firms.45 Initially, this may seem paradoxical because state legislatures have granted closely held corporations considerable freedom to deviate from the usual housekeeping rules of standard
corporate governance.
Yet, there may be a coherent explanation for this oversight.

Courts may grant greater flexibility to closely held firms, but
condition this additional discretion on a more exacting standard
of loyalty. Why? Part of the explanation may be that participants in closely held firms do not have access to a securities

"I Most corporate statutes contain mandatory features requiring, for example, annual reports to shareholders, specifying supermajorities for certain fundamental corporate changes (such as a merger or liquidation), establishing fiduciary duties and legal
remedies, limiting permissible dividends and other distributions, regulating the issuance
of shares, and restricting indemnification.
" Most recently there have been several waves of state takeover statutes that have
resulted in a new layer of mandatory restrictions. Representative of this new "second
generation" of takeover statutes is N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986) (prohibiting corporate combinations for five years after a hostile takeover and regulating the
terms of subsequent mergers). I discuss these new statutes elsewhere. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers:The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 93-103
(1986). For a review of the movement toward an "enabling" body of corporate law, see
Branson, Countertrendsin CorporationLaw: Model Business CorporationAct Revision,
British Company Law Reform, and Principlesof Corporate Governance and Structure,
68

MINN.

L. REV. 53 (1983).

See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 328
N.E.2d 505 (1975); Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). These cases, by
discovering new fiduciary duties, give minority shareholders in a closely held firm far
more protection against exploitation than would have likely been afforded a shareholder
in a widely-held public corporation (who has the protection of access to the market).
It seems improbable that the Donahue and Wilkes decisions in particular would
have been decided the same way if the corporations had been publicly held. Compare
Donahue and Wilkes with Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (permitting a selective repurchase).
"5
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market as an escape mechanism; they thus are more exposed to
potential exploitation. But another broader explanation may be
that the corollary of the need for greater flexibility is also the
need for closer judicial monitoring. In this view, the freedom to
modify the rules of the game has limits that courts implicitly
understand, even if they seldom articulate them. This assertion
that there is a non-negotiable component to corporate law does
not preclude opting out, but places limits on it, and sees judicial
oversight as the corollary of this flexibility. Also, the right to opt
out carries an unstated premise: if you do not do so, you have
even more clearly accepted the traditional ground rules.
3. Economic Objections
Bad history can sometimes make good law. Thus, it does
not resolve matters to argue that the new learning among contractarians is wrong when it asserts that the private corporation
was actually understood by earlier generations to be a private
contract to which the state was only a nominal party. Even if
this contractarian thesis is wrong historically, it still may have a
powerful normative appeal. Its core normative argument is that
when investors get what they pay for, there is no unfairness.
Thus, if the pricing mechanism works, it matters not that the
promoters have promised very little.
What, if anything, is wrong with this argument? Professor
Brudney has challenged it essentially on the grounds that the
pricing will be inaccurate. In his rich, provocative article, he
has offered a list of reasons why in his judgment market pricing
cannot substitute for actual bargaining. In particular, he emphasizes: (1) that there is a systematic informational asymmetry between investors and managers that favors the latter; (2) that
stock prices are more affected by factors relating to the systematic risk of a security than to "firm specific" factors; and (3) that
the risks of fiduciary mismanagement cannot be accurately anticipated (in part because new risks constantly arise).47
These arguments strike me as largely true, but not dispositive. Accurate pricing can occur in a market even in the face of
significant informational asymmetries so long as enough sophis-

46

Brudney, supra note 30, at 1420-27.

47 Id.
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ticated investors understand the contract terms that are being
offered.4 More importantly, there is, I believe, a better way to
make the point at which Professor Brudney is clearly driving.
Accurate pricing does not alone eliminate the potential for "unfair" wealth transfers from shareholders to managers; nor does
accurate pricing alone produce allocational efficiency. Why is
this so? A price can be "accurate" in a technical sense and yet
reflect the considerable uncertainty that exists about the term
being priced. This is because an "accurate" price may simply reflect the range of uncertainty as to the likely amount of managerial misappropriation of corporate returns to which shareholders
are legally entitled. For example, if there is a 50% risk that a
particular management will somehow divert 30% of all future
returns to their firm, risk neutral investors should rationally discount the value of such a corporation's shares by 15%. This penalty may or may not be borne by those who originally sold the
shares, but either way the discount will prove inadequate for
some firms, because for these the risk will prove to be 100%.
The point will be examined in more detail in a moment, but
its central implication is that for pricing to be an adequate substitute for bargaining, it must lead to something else - something that economists call "bonding." Bonding is essentially a
mechanism by which the agent guarantees his performance to
the principal. Managers, as agents, can bond themselves by voluntarily placing themselves in a position where they will lose
more than investors if specified events or conditions (such as opportunistic behavior) occur. In theory, for example, managers
could accept a management compensation formula geared to the
"firm specific" component of the corporation's stock price after
subtracting out the systematic risk component. 9 Thus, they
would have "bonded" themselves not to shirk responsibility because their salary would be directly correlated to the firm's
performance.
Yet, when we look to the real world, we can observe very

48

See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.

549, 569-79 (1984); Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 640-51 (1979).
4 For a description of how such a contract could be designed so that the executive's
compensation is tied to the market's evaluation of his firm and not simply to stock price
levels generally, see Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: CreatingIncentives
to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1985).
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few, if any, instances of anything approaching such bonding behavior. Stock options only superficially resemble bonding and
generally fail to align managerial and shareholder interests, both
because they rise and fall in value based on general stock market
levels (i.e., their value correlates more with systematic risk) and
because, if the stock price falls, management may simply cause
the board to cancel the old options and issue new ones at a lower
price.
This absence of observable bonding in areas where economic
theory would predict its prevalence has been noticed by others.
In his study of insider trading, Professor Michael Dooley
searched for evidence of bonding, monitoring, or signaling devices that could assure investors that management was not engaged in insider trading or otherwise exploiting the informational asymmetries that favor it."0 Finding none, he concluded
that therefore investors were not significantly concerned about
insider trading practices. However, as others have pointed out,"1
this finding is equally consistent with another hypothesis: that
managers lack sufficient incentive to install monitoring and
bonding controls because their own economic welfare is not correlated closely enough with the firm's stock price performance to
justify installation of such devices that are personally costly. Is
this alternative hypothesis realistic? I think it is, at least with
respect to some areas where control of managerial conflicts of
interest would be particularly costly to managers."
Recent empirical research, particularly that by Professors
Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, finds that executive compensation in fact is not closely tied to the firm's stock perform-

foDooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. RFv. 1, 44-55
(1980). For a more general view that true bonding is seldom observed in practice, see
Brudney, supra note 30, at 1422-23 & n.49.
5 See Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting:A CriticalResponse to the "Chicago
School", 1986 DUKE IJ. 628, 640 n.45.

52 1 recognize that some forms of monitoring controls have long been standard, such
as the use of independent auditors and outside directors, even though they are not legally mandated. See Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems,Auditing, and the Theory
of The Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L & EcoN. 613 (1983). The absence of such controls
is, however, clearly visible to most at very low search costs. Much higher search costs
must be incurred with respect to potential conflicts over compensation formulas, insider
trading practices, and takeover defensive tactics (particularly in the last case where some
resistance may be beneficial, but successful resistance is a financial disaster for shareholders). See Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation By Targets: Do Interests Diverge
in a Merger?, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 151 (1985).
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ance 53 Specifically, Jensen and Murphy found that the typical
chief executive officer's salary plus bonuses changes less than
two cents for every thousand dollar's change in the equity value
of the firm.54 Such a finding is almost the converse of what economic theory would predict and also suggests why little bonding
is in fact observable: Managers need not bond themselves if
agency costs are sufficiently high to permit them to structure
their own compensation formulas in a manner that leaves them
relatively indifferent to the firm's stock price performance.
The relevance of this absence of bonding to the question of
the extent to which pricing can substitute for bargaining is best
explained by focusing on what the market does when it estimates the impact of a risk on the firm's future returns. Essentially, the market views a risk as a probability dispersion. Economists model this process of risk evaluation in terms of two
variables: mean and variance. 5 One estimates the probability
dispersion for the corporation's expected future returns by assigning probabilities to all possible outcomes. The weighted average of all these possibilities gives us a mean value. To know
the impact of the specific risk being priced on the probability
dispersion for the corporation's future returns, we also have to
measure the degree of uncertainty surrounding our judgment.
Variance is the statistical measure of this uncertainty; in effect,
it measures the distance from the mean of the probability dispersion to its extremities.
Assume for the moment that shareholders could focus on
the risk of fiduciary abuse and could accurately estimate both its
impact on mean value and variance. Thus, they could accurately
"price" the reduction in expected returns caused by the potential for fiduciary abuse. Yet, there is likely to be substantial uncertainty (and hence a high variance) about this expected reduc" See M. Jensen & K. Murphy, Are Executive Compensation Contracts Properly
Structured?Working Paper, Managerial Economic Research Center, University of Rochester (June, 1987), at 3-14.
" Id. at 12 ("CEOs receive average raises of less than a penny (940) for each $1,000
of increased shareholder wealth and get pay cuts of less than a penny when shareholders

lose $1,000"). When stock ownership is also factored in, this figure jumps, however, to
$1.41 per $1,000 increase or decrease in stockholder wealth.
" For an overview of the valuation process, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CiiIRELSTEIN, CORPORATION FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-75 (3rd ed. 1987); W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE,
BusiNEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 241.62 (2d ed.

1986).
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tion for a variety of reasons: shareholders do not know how
managers tend to exploit the new discretion conferred on them;
secret profits and transactions are possible; managements
change over time as new teams succeed older ones; the need to
preserve reputational capital varies over time and may sometimes stay the hand of those who could divert assets; other social
controls and personal morality may also restrain opportunistic
behavior; new opportunities for unfair self-dealing may arise in
the future - after all, abuses such as "greenmail" were simply
not known twenty years ago. Nor can shareholders simply assume the worst, because other social controls and personal morality will restrain many (and probably most) managers. All
these factors make it difficult to estimate the expected loss
within a narrow range. As a result, a stock price can be "accurate" in the sense that the price accurately measures the range
of this uncertainty, but a potential for unfairness can remain because of the substantial variance in expected future corporate
returns makes it possible for management to profit by behaving
worse than was expected. Only when bonding mechanisms induce managers to reduce that variance does the potential for unfairness dissipate.
The foregoing analysis is oversimplified and unrealistic in
several respects that require qualification. First, the assumption
that the market evaluates the risk of fiduciary abuse on a firm
specific basis needs re-examination. Much more likely is that the
market makes this judgment not on a firm-by-firm basis but generically across a range of similarly situated stocks. Only those
firms (notably few, I believe) that can credibly distinguish themselves from the herd through signaling, monitoring, or bonding
will be separately and individually "priced." Given this view of
fiduciary misconduct as at least in part an aspect of systematic
risk, the experience of one firm in which one group of investors
is deceived or mistreated by one team of venal managers will
necessarily impact on the evaluation of the risk of fiduciary
abuse for the class as a whole. In short, there will be external
effects, because bad managers will raise the cost of capital to
good managers, unless the latter can credibly signal their higher
virtue. This last exception seems a small one, because the managerial cast is constantly changing and publicly disclosed information provides little basis for assessment.
Another criticism of the foregoing analysis is that it is trivi-
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alized by the fact of shareholder diversification. If shareholders
hold diversified portfolios, they should not care much about firm
specific risk, particularly given the generally modest losses (on a
per share basis) that fiduciary misconduct can cause. However, if
the risk is really a systematic one (because all firms must incur
agency costs), diversification is no longer a satisfactory remedy.
More importantly, arguments about unfairness can easily be
translated into arguments about allocative efficiency. When
managers receive secret profits or are able to divert assets
through undisclosed self-dealing, the prospect of inefficiency is
high, in part because managers are escaping the discipline of the
market. Indeed, even in the case of the better than average firm,
there is a similar allocational inefficiency because this firm's cost
of capital is too high. Overall, because investors who face high
uncertainty demand a higher return than those who do not, the
inability of the market to estimate the risk of loss in this area
with precision results in an unnecessary and socially inefficient
increase in the average cost of capital experienced by all firms.
In short, there is an externality.
Initially, my point then is that the pricing mechanism is far
from a perfect substitute for bargaining in those circumstances
where there is likely to be substantial uncertainty associated
with the term being priced. In contrast, in actual bargaining,
greater certainty is obtainable; the parties can include warranties, provide for monitoring and auditing procedures, can utilize
bonding devices that reduce the uncertainty associated with the
risk of agent misbehavior. In short, bargainingblends naturally
into bonding. But pricing does not lead as naturally to this result. The great organizational distance that separates investors
from managers complicates the process of bonding. Managers
cannot make detailed representations and warranties to the
market in the same way they can to a handful of investors.
Rather, they must attempt to make broad and somewhat crude
signals that may not be fully credible. Nor can one management
team credibly signal the considerable uncertainty that surrounds
the future team of managers that eventually will replace it. Absent credible bonding, pricing can be "accurate" but it still impounds the considerable uncertainty that surrounds future behavior of managers who have interests that potentially conflict
with those of the shareholders.
What explains the puzzling relative absence of bonding?
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Several answers suggest themselves. The explanation given earlier that overly crude compensation formulas leave managers
with little incentive to bond is only a partial explanation."' Additionally, there is the risk factor. Managers make relatively
poor risk bearers because they have a much greater and nondiversifiable investment in the firm in the form of human capital. This helps explain why managers cannot afford to take their
entire salary in the form of stock options or a similar compensation formula that rewards them only to the extent that they outperform the stock market. Still, even this thesis does not explain
why managers do not bond against the risk of fiduciary misconduct, which is in theory within their own control and hence does
not involve risk. One answer here may be that for such a guarantee to be effective, each manager would have to guarantee not
only his personal performance but also that of his fellow and
future managers as well. Vicarious liability in such a form is always distasteful and involves risks managers may not feel they
can bear. Finally, there is the basic truth that the technology of
bonding is not well developed. How does one prevent insider
trading through private bonding? At least to this author, the answer is not clear, and almost certainly any effective proposal
would be very costly.
The bottom line to this analysis emerges if these arguments
lead us to conclude that (1) managements can seldom convey
assurances to investors that the latter deem reliable that the former will not engage in opportunistic self-dealing, and (2) the
market evaluates corporate managements largely on a generic
basis in appraising the risk of fiduciary misconduct. Given these
conclusions, economic analysis suggests that "rational" managers
will find it personally costly to be more honest than average.
This is a familiar issue in economics, sometimes called the "market for lemons" problem. 5 7 A "lemons market" arises if there is
uncertainty about the quality of a product and no competitor
can find a means of assuring consumers that its product has
above average quality. As a result, rational competitors will reduce their investment in product quality, because they cannot

See text accompanying note 52 supra.

See, e.g., Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons." Quality Uncertaintyand the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970); Grossman, The InformationalRole of Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 461 (1981).
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recover their costs from this competition through receipt of a
higher price. By analogy, if those managements that intend to
perform above the "average" standard in terms of their fiduciary
responsibilities cannot obtain a higher price for their shares in
return for doing so, they should rationally regress to the mean.
In theory, a "race to the bottom" should begin, and the mean
value may slowly sink. Similarly, if substantial uncertainty surrounds the "opting out" process and the market has difficulty
evaluating the quality of such charter amendments or management's future intentions regarding them, then "bad" (or low
quality) amendments will begin to drive out "good" ones.
Where does this analysis lead us in policy terms? Obviously,
it suggests that we cannot rely on market efficiency alone because accurate pricing does not alone eliminate unfairness or
produce optimal allocational efficiency. If pricing does not discipline managers adequately, a conclusion that Professors Jensen
and Murphy's research seems to underscore, because they find
compensation formulas to be largely unrelated to stock performance,5 8 and if bonding works better in theory than in practice,
then a case exists for mandatory controls in order to discipline
managers. From this perspective, some components of standard
corporate law, whether ex ante controls, such as the monitoring
board, or ex post controls, such as the derivative action, should
be beyond the scope of the shareholder's power to opt out, at
least in the case of the publicly held corporation. Statutory corporate law should then be seen as more than simply a baseline
"default" set of rules; rather, the case for a partially mandatory
character rests as much on considerations of allocative efficiency
as of fairness, because uncertainty results in a higher cost of
capital throughout the economy as a whole.
This last claim that opting out can cause an externality,
namely, a higher cost of capital, needs to be qualified in one important respect. Although opting out can produce greater investor uncertainty and hence a higher cost of capital, its impact will
largely be limited to those firms that do opt out. That is, the
market will discount the expected future returns of such firms
differently because it has little experience with how managers
can or will behave under these altered legal rules, but this uncer-

" See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
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tainty should not affect the stocks prices of those firms that observe the traditional "default" rules of corporate governance. In
short, there will be two separate equilibria: one for those corporations that opt out, and another for those that accept the default rule. Thus, the "lemons market" effect should be limited to
those firms that do opt out. Hence, the third party effects are
limited to other firms that opt-out, and only those shareholders
who approve opt-out provisions (and their successors) will be affected - arguably, by the consequences of their own actions.
Yet, because shareholder consent can often be obtained by a
variety of threats and/or special inducements (including special
dividends or recapitalizations that effectively bribe shareholders
with their own money), issues of fairness (and allocative efficiency) remain." Unless the corporation opts out at or before
the time it first "goes public," it is unlikely that the entrepreneurs who founded the firm will "pay" for the increased uncertainty that opting out causes by receiving a reduced price for
their shares. In a management controlled firm, any loss will thus
be borne instead by the existing shareholders, and if the managers own only a small percentage of their firm's stock, this cost
will largely fall on others. In short, mid-stream charter amendments present the context where the problem of opportunism is
most acute.
Whatever one thinks of the contractarian position in the abstract, special difficulties arise when the focus shifts to remedies.
This is because the very idea of contract presupposes a promise
that is enforceable - that is, a promise for whose breach the law
provides a remedy.6 0 To this extent, private ordering involves an
irreducible level of reliance on the state to enforce promises between private parties through its courts or other legal institutions. Although private enforcement procedures (such as arbitration) are imaginable, these also ultimately depend on the courts
to enforce and validate them. Thus, we are taken back full circle

59 See Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 75 CALIF. L. REV. (1987) (forthcoming).
60 Some theorists have suggested that contracting parties could design self-enforcing
remedies that do not require judicial action. See, e.g., Williamson, Credible Commit-

ments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Amm EcoN. REv. 519 (1983). Such
theorists usually presuppose that the parties are repeat players who expect continued
future dealings. Because few corporations return with regularity to the stock market to
seek equity capital, I doubt this precondition applies to the corporate context.
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to our earlier focus on U.C.C. section 2-719 and its emphasis on
a minimum effective remedy as the test for whether a departure
from the normal default rules is valid. Ultimately, the more we
call the corporation a contract, the more we must look closely at
the limits on permissible modifications of contract remedies.
4. "Gimme That Old Time Religion": A Critique of the
Consensualists
If private contracting cannot be trusted because of the high
information and transaction costs associated with collective
shareholder action (as its critics assert), what alternative do they
offer? If I read Professor Brudney correctly, his position would
be that, at least absent unanimous consent, strict fiduciary principles must govern. He recognizes that society thereby sacrifices
the potential gains that might arise from efficient deviations
from the law's traditional strictures, but in his view, this is the
necessary price for assuring investors of the fidelity of managers
whom they cannot closely monitor or discipline. This is an uncertain trade-off; the costs may exceed the benefits. Moreover, it
is also a prescription for stasis in a world that is rapidly
changing.
My problem with Professor Brudney's analysis is that a
demonstration that movements away from the common law's
baseline may be biased does not in any way validate the adequacy of the baseline position. Are the common law's rules on
due care efficient? Do they express shareholder expectations?
The historical truth is probably that the common law largely
borrowed its original corporate law rules from the law of trusts
because of the paucity of available alternatives. This was understandable and perhaps even inevitable, but still the world of
trusts and corporations co-exist uneasily at best. The corporation is an entrepreneurial, risk-taking organization, while the
trust device was classically used to preserve capital. The trustee
was thus supposed to be risk averse, and the law of trusts certainly encouraged him to be. Given trust law's bias towards conservatism, a tension was inevitable between doctrine and environment, which tension American common law came to reconcile
through the creation of the business judgment rule.
In this light, although the consensualists may be on firm
ground in criticizing the contractarian theory of the corporation,
the footing gets slippery when they tacitly assume that the in-
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feasibility of actual bargaining means that the pre-existing common law standards must control. If it is a fallacy to assume that
pricing amounts to consent, it is an equivalent fallacy to assume
that shareholders have consented to the pre-existing legal
norms. In principle, they may be simply ignorant or indifferent.
Put differently, just as it is doubtful that private contracting out
of the common law will fulfill the shareholders's expectations, so
is it also doubtful that their expectations coincide with the common law rules that history dealt them. In short, while the "rhetoric of contract" may legitimate excessive managerial discretion,
"fiduciary rhetoric" could equally justify unthinking devotion to
anachronistic legal dogma.
Where then are we left? If contracting out is suspicious, and
if the baseline legal norms are also open to challenge because
claims as to their efficiency and congruence with shareholder expectations seem unsupported, we need some anchoring point
upon which to rest a theoretical foundation. One approach that
others have suggested utilizes a hypothetical bargaining game."1
To do this, one asks: What would rational shareholders have
agreed upon in a world of low transaction costs? What rules
would they reach as to self-dealing, permissible takeover defensive tactics, or due care liability? My own guess is that the rules
they would reach would pretty closely approximate the existing
law of fiduciary duties with respect to self-dealing, but might be
quite different with respect to due care liability and takeover
defensive tactics.
Why? Let's walk through such a bargaining game as a heuristic exercise. As our starting point, we can assume that rational
bargainers would first identify a risk and then determine the
best risk bearer with respect to it. This resembles the standard
Calabresian approach to tort law issues under which one seeks
the best cost avoider. One such risk is, of course, the risk of negligent business decisions. Almost certainly, directors are poor
risk bearers here because they cannot diversify and may have
difficulty in obtaining insurance; equally important, the full
costs here include the cost of excessive risk aversion, which
shareholders bear if directors are made too risk averse. Argua-

11 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YAL LJ.
698 (1982) (legal rules should mirror ex ante agreements shareholders would reach in the
absence of transaction costs).
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bly, however, rational bargainers would still place some of the
cost of negligent decisions on directors in order to avoid a moral
hazard problem. In contrast, no ceiling would be likely for duty
of loyalty violations, because managers are the best cost avoiders
with respect to losses resulting from self-dealing and secret profits. Indeed, investors would confront great and socially wasteful
uncertainty if they were asked to bear that risk; that is, we
would again confront the "lemons market" problem earlier discussed. Hence, this approach suggests a stricter judicial attitude
toward attempts to vary those default rules that define the duty
of loyalty than those that specify the duty of care.
In rebuttal, some will respond, as has Professor Brudney,
that this approach is too indeterminate to prove anything. For
example, others may engage in the same hypothetical bargaining
and emerge with the different conclusion that directors should
be liable up to, say, ten, fifteen, or twenty-five percent of their
personal assets. Still, even if this hypothetical bargaining approach is admittedly indeterminate by itself, this problem is
largely cured by the specificity that actual charter amendments
supply. In reality, the court is called upon to decide not what
outcome rational bargainers would reach, but rather whether a
persuasive case exists for believing that they could reach the
specific outcome embodied in the actual charter provision before
it.
When one turns to the specific context of remedies, what
kinds of bargains can we imagine being struck? Conceivably,
shareholders might believe that (1) market forces alone were
sufficient to enforce managerial diligence, (2) legal remedies had
a high error rate that could make management excessively risk
averse, or (3) the costs of legal remedies, such as the derivative
action, were unnecessarily high in comparison with remedies
that could be designed through private ordering. Alternatively, if
they believed that the duty of care was not, itself, substantively
meaningful, they might be prepared to trade this right away in
return for managerial concessions on some other point. Finally,
because arbitration is a private proceeding without public or
press access, it is arguable that shareholders might prefer such a
substituted remedy to protect corporate privacy. These possible
justifications are not frivolous, but they seem overbroad if they
also leave the duty of loyalty unprotected.
One last problem with the consensualists' position is that it
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forces us to rely on legislative revisions that impact on all shareholders, including those of firms that would not have opted out.
In the recent legislative stampede to enact limitations on liability for due care violations, some states (for example, Indiana)
have in effect abolished the old strict duty of care norm across
the board, while others (for example, Delaware) permit opting
out from that rule.6 2 The second approach seems preferable, because it creates less uncertainty. In theory, only those corporations that in fact opt out incur the cost of greater uncertainty; in
reality, this may not be quite the case because of the risk of future amendments, but the impact of uncertainty still should be
much smaller on those firms that do not opt out. In contrast,
Indiana's approach subjects all shareholders to greater uncertainty. To be sure, this difference may not be empirically measurable because the term being priced may have too little impact
on share value, but at least in theory we confine the greater uncertainty to a subclass of corporations under a Delaware "opting
out" approach.
IM-.

ARBITRATION AND CHARTER AMENDMENTS

In the wake of recent state legislation, limitations on due
care liability are already a fait accompli. The issue for the future is just now emerging in the wake of two 1987 Supreme
Court decisions: Can charter amendments provide for arbitration and thereby preclude a derivative action? In Shearsoni
American Express v. McMahon,63 the Court held that a provision in a brokerage agreement providing for arbitration of any
controversy relating to the customer's account precluded a suit
based on Rule 10b-5. Without explicitly overruling Wilko v.
Swan," which had found claims arising under the Securities Act
of 1933 not to be subject to compulsory arbitration, the Court
indicated that the burden is on the party opposing arbitration to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Apparently, Wilko is
henceforth to be read as barring arbitration only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue - a
2

Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums Supp. 1987) with DEL CODE Am

tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1986).
107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
-4 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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conclusion that the Court has indicated it will not easily reach.
Potentially even more significant in its possible impact on
the corporate context was the Court's holding in Perry v.
Thomas65 that an arbitration agreement may be enforced in federal court pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, even though
state law provides that such an agreement could not preclude a
judicial action. 6 In effect, Perry seems to hold that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts state statutory law conferring express
rights of action. The potential implications of this holding for
corporate governance seem both astonishing and fundamentally
at odds with the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis in a series
of decisions that corporations are creatures of state law. 7
Together, McMahon and Perry will encourage the proponents of alternative methods of dispute resolution to propose
charter amendments under which all internal corporate disputes
should be resolved through arbitration. Arguably, both the derivative action and some actions based on Rule 10b-5 could be
either preempted or precluded by an agreement to arbitrate set
forth in the corporation's certificate of incorporation and, in theory, accepted by shareholders when they acquired their shares.
Moreover, although arbitration as used in the securities industry
to resolve customer/broker disputes has always been conducted
under the oversight of the stock exchanges and the SEC, which
have established industry-wide arbitration panels, no similar
level of oversight exists with respect to private corporations.
Within the brokerage industry, arbitration has received
mixed reviews in terms of its fairness to the plaintiff. 8 Propoe' 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).

6' Section 229 of the California Labor Code provided that actions for the collection
of wages may be maintained "without regard to the existence of any private agreement
to arbitrate." CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971). The majority opinion by Justice Marshall found the provision to be preempted by section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Perry, 107 S. Ct. at 2526-27; see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Strong dissents by Justices Stevens
and O'Connor pointed out that the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was never to
preempt state law, but to provide a simplified means of enforcement of arbitration agreements that were valid under state law. 107 S. Ct. at 2527-28 (Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting). As Justice O'Connor effectively argued, there is a fundamental inconsistency
between McMahon and Perry because McMahon framed a test where arbitration was
enforceable unless there was a clear legislative intent to preclude the waiver of a judicial
forum and precisely such an intent is apparent in the California legislation.
", See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1977).
68 Compare Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements, 71 MNN. L. REv. 393 (1987), with Brown, Shell & Tyson, Arbi-
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nents of arbitration point out that in the brokerage area most
cases are resolved within the same year in which they are filed,
that arbitration panels grant damages to roughly half of all customers who arbitrate their securities complaints, and that damage awards equal, on average, about half the amount requested. 9 Opponents, however, cite statistics showing that
seventy-eight percent of those who receive damages recover sixty
percent or less of the amount they said they had lost - thus
suggesting that the fifty percent victory ratio is deceptive." In
overview, there are obviously points to be made on both sides.
More importantly for our purposes, arbitration in the securities industry has a unique procedural twist that corporations
are almost certain to copy if they begin to insert arbitration provisions into their charters: the plaintiff generally has no role in
selecting the arbitrator, as does the plaintiff in arbitration under
the American Arbitration Association's rules.71 Instead, under
the Uniform Code of Arbitration governing most securities proceedings, industry panels hear the plaintiff's claims. Although
these panels are appointed by the National Association of Securities Dealers or the stock exchanges and must contain a majority
of "public arbitrators,"72 this term includes lawyers and others
who work for firms that represent the brokerage industry. Here
then lies the rub: at present, a majority or all of a panel may
consist of lawyers or brokers who directly practice in the securitration of Customer-Broker Disputes Arising Under the Federal Securities Laws and
RICO, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1987).

6"Shell, Keep Broker-Client Disputes Out of Court, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1987, at 32,
col. 3. See Fletcher, supra note 68, at 452-53 (citing data for 1981, 1982, and 1983).
70 See Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, at
B1, col. 4 (citing data compiled by Professor David A. Lipton of Catholic University
involving 40 randomly selected cases - a comparatively small data base).
71 Under the Uniform Code of Arbitration, adopted by all the major stock exchanges, the investor may demand an arbitration panel made up of a majority from
outside the securities industry. UNIFORM CODE OF ARBrrATzoN, R.607(a)(2) (as adopted
by New York Stock Exchange) (reprinted in ARBrrRTION RuLes, 2 New York Stock
Exchange Guide (as amended, June 18, 1986)) [hereinafter UNFoiu CODE OF ARramAToN]. See Fletcher, supra note 68, at 451-52. The parties also each have one peremptory
challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. Critics claim, however, that the Uniform
Code of Arbitration employs a very relaxed definition of "outside the securities industry"
and that the panels have a pro-industry bias. See Glaberson, supra note 70, at col. 4
(quoting such critics). See also Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 904, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1976) (criticizing New York Stock Exchange arbitration procedures as unfair).
72 UNIFORM CODE OF ARIrrATION, supra note 71, R. 607(a)(1).
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ties industry and possibly have an engrained antipathy for plaintiff-shareholders. In short, an issue of "structural bias" arises
here that resembles the similar issue surrounding the perform3
ance of the special litigation committees.
Predictably, if arbitration were authorized as a remedy that
the corporate charter could make exclusive for at least some
range of cases, many corporations will seek to provide for arbitration by either a panel of disinterested directors or by some
other panel of management-appointed experts. Arguably, the
doctrinal leap is not that great from current law in New York
and Delaware, which generally permits a committee of disinterested directors to reject a derivative suit and thereby foreclose
substantive judicial review, even of egregious self-dealing. 4 In
fact, however, the leap is significant because judicial review of an
arbitration decision is virtually non-existent, whereas it is open
to a court in cases where a board or special litigation committee
rejects the action either to find that demand was excused or that
procedural errors were made by the board or committee in conducting its review. 75 Today, the special litigation committee operates under at least the potential oversight of a court, while an
arbitration panel does not.
In any event, the experience to date with special litigation
committees has not been happy and shows that such committees, once appointed, almost invariably decide to reject the action and recommend its dismissal.7 6 For exactly this reason, the

73 See generally Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1981); Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation:A Critique of Zapata and
the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959.
74 For the leading cases, see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 22 ALR 4th
1190 (1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979); see also commentators cited at note 73 supra.
7' The "demand required/demand excused" distinction was formalized by the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). In cases where demand is excused (on somewhat elusive criteria), the court may review the substantive
justifications for dismissal. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). Also a
court may review the special litigation committee's work where its "good faith" or the
"procedural adequacy" of its investigation are not shown. See Hasan v. Cleveland Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984).
" See Cox, supra note 73, at 963 (survey finding no case in which the litigant has
failed to recommend dismissal against incumbent directors). See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (the committee permitted the action to continue against certain
former executive officers).
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ALI Corporate Governance Project has sought to generalize a requirement of substantive judicial review." If such committees
were instead reconstituted as arbitration panels, they might represent an even more biased fact-finder - one that from the
plaintiff's attorney's perspective resembled the jury Daniel Webster faced in Stephen Vincent Benet's short story. Thus, it is
easy to fear that an unholy coalition of naive, "touchy-feely" believers in ADR, and more hard-headed, but deeply conservative,
representatives of corporate managements might combine to
eliminate shareholders' access to effective litigation remedies.
The former may be innocently seeking to extend mediation procedures, which may work well within an interacting community,
to a context where there is no community and where shareholder
action is already hobbled by serious "free rider" problems; the
latter believe that litigation against corporate management is inherently undesirable and often extortionate. Together, they
could achieve much mischief.
Against this backdrop, it may seem strange that my remaining comments will seek not to bury arbitration but to preserve
some role for it. Arbitration does have potential advantages: (1)
lower cost, (2) relative speed, and (3) expertise. Only in Delaware can the litigants probably expect a state trial court to have
the same sophistication and expertise as an arbitration panel.
Presumably, both sides would agree in a hypothetical bargaining
game between equal antagonists that if the delay and costs of
the remedy to each could be decreased then such a change
should be adopted.78 Yet, expertise can easily blend into bias
-or, at least, into an unconscious predisposition against the
plaintiff as an outsider and usurper of the board's role. Thus,
the challenge is to design an arbitration remedy that preserves
the basic (if not always well realized) function of a judicial remedy: namely, an external monitoring body having both expertise

"See

ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERANcE: ANALYSIS AND RECOE'WNDATIONS

§ 7.08 (Tent. Draft No. 6, Oct. 10, 1986). This author is serving as the Reporter to the
ALI for the remedies section of its Corporate Governance Project.
7' This conclusion does not necessarily follow, however, if the antagonists lack equal
financial resources or if there is a litigation cost advantage favoring one side. Both these
factors may be present (and partially offsetting) in much derivative litigation. Coffee,
Understandingthe Plaintiffls Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Dericative Actions, 86 CoLu.m L. Rzv. 669,
701-04 (1986).
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and sufficient distance from the participants to be capable of
disinterested judgment. In principle, there is no reason why arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, which assure at least one neutral arbitrator, is not capable
of approximating this result; however, on the level of practice, I
believe the difficulties of designing such a remedy are
considerable.
In its favor, arbitration may even be capable of providing
shareholders greater access to external monitoring. The inherent
rationale of an arbitration remedy is to permit the arbitrators
greater flexibility and informality because of their relative expertise. Both by tradition and logic, the remedy is not constrained by the same procedural issues of standing that today
constrain the derivative action. Here, a key trade-off comes into
view. By its inherent logic, arbitration should be a flexible remedy, and thus it should not be limited by most of the standard
restrictions that guard the derivative action much like the sand
traps surrounding the eighteenth hole on a championship green.
In particular, it is arguable that an arbitration panel should not
be subject to the limitations of the demand rule, the contemporaneous ownership requirement, special pleading rules, security
for expense bonds and similar requirements.79 This means that

if the corporation elected to adopt an arbitration remedy, it
should not also be able to avail itself of a special litigation committee or to reject demand and claim that the plaintiff was
thereby not entitled to proceed with arbitration. In short, an arbitration remedy, as so conceived, would generally reach the
merits of the dispute early on, while this happens rarely in derivative litigation today.
Yet, even if logic suggests such a trade-off, there is little
reason to expect managements to give up the protection of these
doctrinal obstacles. Predictably, corporate managements will
seek to have it both ways - to preserve the demand rule and
utilize arbitration only in terms of the limited role for judicial
review preserved under such a rule. This likelihood frames the
central question: Under what circumstances should an arbitration remedy be upheld? To reach an intelligent answer, it is useful next to survey the legal and economic obstacles to an effec" For an overview of the limitations on standing to bring a derivative action, see
ALI, supra note 77, at §§ 7.02-.04.
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tive corporate arbitration remedy.
A.

Legal Objections

To date, courts have been more hostile than receptive to
provisions (usually contained in a stockholders' agreement) that
seek to require that intra-corporate disputes be submitted to ar-

bitration. The following legal objections to an arbitration provision have either been raised already or may be raised in the foreseeable future.
1. Sterilization of the Board. A provision requiring arbitration may be thought to infringe on the universal provision in

corporation codes that "the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by, or under the direction of, its board of

directors." A number of courts have so held, typically in cases
where the arbitration provision in a stockholders' agreement was
invoked to resolve a dispute over business plans, dividend payments, or the dismissal of an officer." Conversely, one well
known New York case, Matter of Vogel,8 1 seems to go the oppo-

site way and at least provisionally permit the arbitration proceeding to continue, but Vogel is probably better explained by

the fact that the two parties constituted all the shareholders of
the corporation. Thus, Vogel is in the tradition of earlier New
York cases, such as Clark v. Dodge,8 2 which have upheld sub-

stantial deviations from the usual model of corporate governance
in the context of closely held firms where there had been unanimous consent to the special provision.8

Still, if the objection to arbitration is that it "sterilizes" the
11See, e.g., Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Long Park,
Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633, 79 N.Y.S.2d
177 (1948); Matter of Glekel, 37 A.D.2d 1, 321 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1st Dep't 1971), reu'd, 30
N.Y.2d 93, 281 N.E.2d 171, 330 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1980); Menaker v. Padover, 75 A.D.2d 807,
427 N.Y.S.2d 495 (2d Dep't 1980); cf. Matter of Burkin (Katz), 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d
862, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956). See also Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a Remedy for
Intra-CloseCorporationDisputes, 56 V. L Rnv. 271 (1970).
8119 N.Y.2d 589, 224 N.E.2d 738, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1967).
269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). But see Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New
Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948) (agreement which completely sterilizes powers of directors over management is voidable even though initially
consented to by all shareholders).
Outside of New York, there are even stronger authorities. See Glazer v. Glazer,
374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); Galler v. Galler, 32 IlL 2d 16,
203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
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board, a carefully drawn charter provision may be able to avoid,
or at least minimize, any infringement on the board's authority.s4 For example, if the arbitrator were denied any authority to

grant injunctive, equitable, or other prospective relief, but could
simply award damages for the breach of a fiduciary duty, the
board would incur no more intrusion into its zone of autonomy
than if the plaintiff instead went to court. Alternatively, the provision could deny the arbitration panel any ability to re-consider
or reverse business decisions to the extent that they were protected by the business judgment rule. To be sure, new problems
are raised by any such proposal to deny the arbitration panel
the ability to grant some forms of relief (i.e., injunctions), because courts are apt to read such an exclusion as meaning that
the plaintiff could then sue in court for this relief. Predictably,
plaintiffs would include a claim for injunctive relief and thereby
seek to overcome the desired exclusivity that the provision was
intended to achieve. Still, the basic idea seems correct. If arbitration were focused solely on redressing violations of fiduciary
duties, it should not be seen as infringing upon, or "sterilizing,"
the board.
2. Conflict with Express Statutory Policies. In the case of
an arbitration provision applying to a dispute between a broker
and a client, the justification first offered for enforcing arbitration was that Rule 10b-5 was an implied judicial remedy, not
one expressly authorized by the legislature; hence, the substitution of an arbitration remedy did not conflict with an express
legislative policy.8 5 McMahon did not place significant weight on
this distinction between express and implied remedies, ss but in84Of course, a statute could also overcome this obstacle. For example, the Arizona
statute permits the certificate of incorporation to provide "for arbitration of any deadlock or dispute involving the internal affars of the corporation." Aruz. GEN. CORP. LAW §

206 (1977). Broader statutes that simply authorize arbitration in all controversies that
might be the subject of an action at law or a suit in equity have been narrowly construed
by courts not to permit interference with the board's discretion in matters of business
policy. See, e.g., Matter of Burkin (Katz), 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 164 N.Y.S.2d
898 (1956) (the removal of a director is a power to be exercised by stockholders and is
not a proper subject for arbitration).
" See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1974) (noting differences
between Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See also Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (questioning applicability of holding in Wilko v. Swan to implied causes of action under the
1934 Act).
"' Most commentators had criticized the Court's suggestion in Scherk that a line
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stead focused on whether the legislative intent was to confer a
judicial remedy in all cases (which question it answered in the
negative). In this light, the fact that the right to bring a derivative action is codified in most jurisdictions (i.e., it is an express
statutory right) carries less weight after McMahon than it had
earlier seemed to when prior decisions upholding arbitration
clauses were making such an express/implied distinction. Still,
numerous state court decisions have invalidated charter provisions that appear to conflict with statutory provisions in the
state's corporations code. 7 Such an express conflict arguably is
present at least in those jurisdictions where the derivative action
is statutorily codified.
At this point, Perry v. Thomas becomes the critical precedent and suggests that state corporation statutes that conflict
with arbitration provisions in the corporate charter could be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.8 8 Before Perry, such a
conclusion would have been virtually unthinkable, given the
prior emphasis placed by the Court on the primary role of the
states in regulating corporate governance. After Perry, it still
seems a bizarre result but one which the Court's reasoning
clearly supports. Perhaps if such a case arose, the Supreme
Court would belatedly recognize the wisdom of the dissenting
opinions in Perry by Justices Stevens and O'Connor."9 Still, such
a case may never arise because state corporate codes do not expressly preclude compulsory arbitration, as did the statute invalidated in Perry. Thus, courts can duck the issue of Perry'sscope
by reading any statutory provision authorizing a derivative action as not intended to preclude arbitration.
Actually, this may be the correct interpretation because
most statutory provisions were probably intended simply to codify the prior common law or to limit shareholder standing to sue.
That is, state statutes codifying the derivative action typically
could be drawn between express and implied causes of action and compulsory arbitration
upheld with respect to the latter. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2347 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[c]ommentators, almost uniformly, have rejected the 'colorable
argument'" that a distinction could be drawn between express and implied causes of
action for purposes of arbitration). As Justice Blackmun's dissent notes, the majority
retreated to a more defensible position in McMahon that largely overrules Wilko, 107 S.
Ct. at 2346.
87 See note 39 supra.
107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987).
,9 107 S. Ct. at 2527 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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confer jurisdiction on courts to hear a derivative action and then
set forth at great length various procedural restrictions on the
shareholder's standing to maintain an action, such as, for example, contemporaneous ownership, security for expense bonds,
and verification requirements. Thus, their primary purpose
seems to be to constrain the common law's remedy by restricting
standing, and hence, the conflict between those statutes and an
arbitration provision seems less serious.
3. Vested Rights. Although state corporation statutes typically set forth a broad power to amend the corporate charter,
even with respect to the rights of outstanding shares, the case
law originally placed some limits on this power by considering
some rights to be "vested." ' 0 Thus, the issue arises as to whether
the holder of outstanding shares can be divested of his right to
sue by a charter amendment. Today, this doctrine of vested
rights has been largely superseded by class voting requirements,
a possible appraisal remedy, and a limited judicial review for
fairness. Still, some jurisdictions might conclude that the shareholder's right to sue cannot be eliminated by a charter amendment with respect to outstanding shares, except (i) pursuant to
explicit legislation, or (ii) with the consent of the shareholder
then holding the shares."'
" See, e.g., Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A.2d 115 (1935) (accrued
dividends a "vested right" that could not be modified); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur
d'Alene Mines Corporation, 60 Idaho 491, 92 P.2d 1057 (1939) (nonassessable shares
could not be changed to assessable shares); State ex rel. Swanson v. Perham, 30 Wash.
2d 368, 376, 191 P.2d 689, 694 (1948) ("vested right" to elect directors by non-cumulative
voting technique was beyond power of legislature to modify for existing corporations,
notwithstanding "reserved power"). But see Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. McCarthy, 94
Wash. 2d 605, 610, 617 P.2d 1023, 1028 (1980) (overruling Swanson). Vested rights theory is today largely a fossilized remnant because of the ease with which corporations can
evade limitations on impermissible charter amendments by merging with a wholly owned
subsidiary. See Bove Community Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 249 A.2d 89 (1969). Still, some
limitations remain. See Halloran, Equitable Limitations on the Power to Amend Articles of Incorporation, 4 PAC. L.J. 47 (1973).
1 Several cases have invalidated the retroactive imposition by a majority vote of
transfer restrictions on non-consenting shareholders. See, e.g., Sandor Petroleum Corp.
v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (state law authorizing corporations to
reasonably restrict sale and transfer of stock did not authorize cancellation of previously
unrestricted stock). But see Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283, 391 P.2d
828, 38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964) (this decision permitting retroactive change was legislatively reversed by section 204(b) of the California Corporations Code). A number of
states legislatively preclude transfer restrictions, even as applied to subsequent transferees, unless the holder at the time of the restriction's adoption consented. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 506 (D. Del. 1981). It is
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A further refinement on this question is whether any such
substitution of remedies could apply retroactively with respect
to causes of action that arose prior to the adoption of the charter
provision (even if no suit was commenced). By analogy, Delaware's recent authorization of charter provisions limiting damages for due care liability applies only prospectively and does
not "limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes effective."9 2 This is a more than trivial point because many derivative
actions involve a long-standing course of conduct extending back
over many years.
4. Lack of Mutuality. In the case of the standard arbitration
clause used in the securities industry, the clause binds both broker and client to accept arbitration. This may not be possible in
the corporate setting, where the defendant is not necessarily another shareholder who has consented to arbitration in advance.
In effect, the defendant has an option: to accept arbitration, or
to resist it and be sued in court. Can the plaintiff be compelled
to accept arbitration when the defendant is not? Probably, the
plaintiff can be so compelled, because the requisite consideration
to support the plaintiff's implicit agreement to accept arbitration can be found in the agreements of the other shareholders in
the corporation also to accept arbitration. In this view, the
shareholders have mutually pledged to use arbitration, if possible, to save time and expense for their corporation. This
amounts to a bilateral contract. Moreover, defendants will probably prefer to accept arbitration (at least if they perceive this
forum to be more favorable), and the lack of mutuality may appear to be a matter of history once a defendant moves to compel
arbitration in response to a derivative action against him. Still,
the parallel between securities industry arbitration and the corporate setting is far from exact.
A related question is whether a valid and binding agreement
to arbitrate, enforceable against all shareholder plaintiffs, can be

uncertain whether this judicial hostility to diminution of an existing shareholders rights
applies only to transfer restrictions (which the common law disfavored as a restraint on
alienability). For cases upholding retroactive changes in other contexts, see, e.g., LaRoche v. Vermont Federal Bank, FSB, 626 F. Supp. 1157 (D. VL 1986); Wilson v. Cherokee Drift Mining Co., 14 Cal. 2d 56, 92 P.2d 802 (1939).
See DEL. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 102(b)(7) (Michie Supp. 1987) (quoted at note 10
supra).
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created by a provision in the corporate charter. Although corporate law clearly considers the corporate charter to be a contract,
the technical question here is whether the law of arbitration
would similarly recognize such a provision as creating an agreement to arbitrate based only on the implied-in-fact acceptance
of the shareholder."3 Is such constructive acceptance sufficient?
Absent such an agreement, judicial remedies cannot be preempted even under Perry9 because the Federal Arbitration Act
would defer to state law on this issue. 5 Divergent answers are
possible, and states might even be able to legislate the conclusion that no enforceable agreement arose based simply on a
charter provision, thereby outflanking Perry and avoiding
preemption.
5. Procedural Adequacy. One of the more common complaints from customers dissatisfied with arbitration proceedings
brought by them against their brokerage firm has been their inability to obtain discovery of materials in the defendant's possession.' Yet, at least in broker/client disputes, the client has
some record of the securities transactions in his account. In contrast, the problem of obtaining adequate discovery grows by an
order of magnitude when arbitration is substituted for a derivative action, because the shareholder can establish the unfairness
11 This question has probably been answered in the affirmative for close corporations, where arbitration is frequently used. In most instances, however, the agreement to
arbitrate was separately executed and signed by the shareholders and was not simply
inserted by a charter amendment adopted by a majority of the shareholders. See, e.g.,
Application of Vogel, 25 A.D.2d 212, 268 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1st Dep't 1966), afl'd, 19 N.Y.2d
589, 224 N.E.2d 738, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1976). The public corporation, however, is a far
different entity, and arguments about implied-in-fact acceptance seem more tenuous
within this context.
In Perry, 107 S. Ct. at 2527 n.9, the Court assumed that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate, but for the state statute forbidding compulsory arbitration.
" Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that an agreement to arbitrate
is valid and enforceable as a matter of federal law "save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1985). See also Perry,
107 S. Ct. at 2527 n.9. Thus, state law seemingly can govern the issue of whether a contract ever arose, so long as it does not uniquely attempt to nullify the Federal Arbitration Act.
"' For representative statements by plaintiffs' attorneys that they are routinely denied adequate discovery in securities brokerage arbitration disputes, see Glaberson,
supra note 70. But see Fletcher, supra note 68, at 453-54 (criticizing this view as a
myth). See also Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2249 (1986) (critizing arbitration system as "an inferior
system of justice").

1988]

NO EXIT

of a self-dealing transaction only by obtaining access to books
and records in the corporation's possession. Although no legal
rule necessitates that discovery must be restricted in arbitration
proceedings, it must at least be recognized that discovery procedures are underdeveloped and informal in the arbitration context and that this factor favors the defendants, who will tend to
be corporate officials. Unless adequate procedural rules can be
developed to assure the plaintiff's need for discovery, a basis exists for a court finding such a charter provision to be against
public policy. 7
6. CollateralEstoppel and the Problem of Collusive Settlements. A derivative suit, like a class action, is a representative
action in which the judgment or settlement binds all other
shareholders from raising the same or similar claims on behalf of
the corporation. American corporate law, therefore, requires that
any settlement of a derivative action be judicially approved."
However, if an arbitration proceeding were substituted by charter amendment for a derivative action, would this same result
follow? That is, would the decision by an arbitration panel collaterally estop other shareholders? Should preclusive effect be
accorded to an arbitration decision or can such effect be conferred only by a judicial order. 99 Of course, if other shareholders
were also required to bring their action before the same arbitration panel, this point may seem academic because there would
be no incentive for other shareholders to bring the same suit

Relatively few decisions have struck down a charter provision as simply against
public policy, but such decisions exist. See, e.g., Greene v. E.11 Rollins & Sons, Inc., 2
A.2d 249 (DeL Ch. 1938).
88 See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23.1; see also ALI, supra note 77, § 7.13 (reviewing rules in
various states).
" Until recently, many assumed that the findings of an arbitrator were not entitled
to preclusive effect in another proceeding brought by a different party, in theory, only
the court's order gave rise to preclusive effect. However, the Supreme Court's recent
decision in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 106 S. Ct. 3220 (1986), suggests that the
law may be in flux in this area. In Elliott, the Court accorded preclusive effect to the fact
findings made by an administrative law judge in a state agency in an employment discrimination case, thereby denying the plaintiff access to a judicial trial de novo. Id. at
3226. Although a private arbitrator can easily be distinguished from an administrative
law judge, it is possible that courts would reach a similar compromise, giving preclusive
effect to the fact findings made by the arbitrator, but reserving the authority to review
the legal conclusions drawn from these facts. For a general overview of the preclusion
issue in arbitration, see Shell, Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration,35 U.C.LA. L REv. (forthcoming in 1988).
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before the same panel.
The other side of this coin is even more troubling. If a single
shareholder can in effect preclude other shareholders from litigating the same action in the corporation's name, a considerable
danger arises of collusive settlements.1 00 In fact, under such a
system, the best strategy for a defendant who has engaged in
unfair self-dealing may be to arrange for such a spurious action
to be brought and adversely decided. Alternatively, the defendant may be able to bribe the plaintiff's attorneys by agreeing to
exchange a high fee award for a low or nominal settlement. This
danger of collusion has long surrounded the derivative action,
but in consequence the law has developed a variety of safeguards: shareholders must be given notice of any proposed settlement, the settlement hearing must be public, objecting shareholders may seek to intervene, and, finally, the court must
approve both the settlement and the fee award to the plaintiff's
attorneys. Whether these protections are adequate can be questioned, but the informal nature of arbitration proceedings is inconsistent with this need for procedural safeguards to assure
that the action is aggressively litigated and that any settlement
reflects a true adversarial discounting of the litigation odds.
Collusive settlements are not the only means by which a
corporate recovery can in effect be diverted. Suppose the plaintiff brings not a derivative action, but a direct action, thereby
seeking not a corporate recovery, but an individual one.10 1 From
the plaintiff's perspective, styling the action as a direct one permits him to settle for personal relief - perhaps the corporation
will buy back his shares at a premium with the approval of the
arbitration panel. The very flexibility of the arbitration process
along with its lesser public visibility, encourages and invites such
novel outcomes, but from a public law perspective, such individual settlements mean that the plaintiff has abandoned his role
as a private attorney general for the other shareholders. To be
sure, this result can also occur in court-litigated cases, but there
an elaborate body of law has been developed to distinguish di100 For a discussion of this problem and examples of the way in which collusion can
occur without explicit agreement, see Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff
As Monitor in ShareholderLitigation, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5 (1985).
I01 The line between direct and derivative actions is often obscure and many transactions can give rise to both direct and derivative causes of action. See ALI, supra note

77, § 7.01 (commentary and Reporter's Notes).
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rect from derivative actions. In the informal setting of arbitration (or similar alternative dispute resolution procedures) it is
easy to forget that the plaintiff has a public law role.
To sum up, the simple truth is that existing arbitration
mechanisms were never designed to substitute for collective proceedings, such as the class or derivative action, in which the interests of numerous persons are aggregated. An accommodation
between arbitration procedures and the class action has yet to
be reached or even realistically addressed, because the proponents of alternative dispute resolution persist in seeing legal adversaries as participants in a small communal group who are
truly seeking a negotiated solution and reconciliation. In fact,
plaintiffs are seeking nothing of the kind; they are participants
not in a community, but a market. In such an anonymous environment, they are more likely to want not therapeutic reconciliation, but adequate general deterrence.
7. Statutory Precedents on Opting Out: Are they a Negative Pregnant?In section 620 of its Business Corporation Law,
New York has adopted a common form of close corporation statute. A corporation may adopt virtually any provision relating to
its internal governance (including presumably a system of arbitration), provided that (1) the provision is adopted by a unanimous shareholder vote, and (2) the corporation's shares are not
"listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in
an over-the counter market . . - Arguably, such a provision
represents an insurmountable barrier to experiments with arbitration in the case of publicly traded corporations (at least in
the case of those corporations incorporated in New York and
states with similar provisions). On the other hand, the New York
statute does not by its terms forbid all deviations from the traditional norms of corporate governance, but only any provision
that "improperly restricts the board in its management of the
corporation" 0 3 - in effect, those provisions that "sterilize" the
board or delegate the board's authority to a shareholder. As
noted earlier, 1°4 an arbitration provision can be designed with a
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 620(c) (McKinney 1986). Subsection (b) of section 620
permits the corporate charter to contain provisions that would otherwise be prohibited,
provided unanimous shareholder consent is obtained for the amendment.
103 Id.
102

101 See text accompanying note 84.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53: 919

scope which extends only to asserted breaches of fiduciary duty
and not to matters of business policy. Still, the policy underlying
section 620 seems to be that shareholder consent is less meaningful and more easily manipulated in the case of publicly held
corporations."' o
Another example of a statutory precedent that authorizes
opting out in a manner that by implication constrains self-help
attempts are those recent exculpatory statutes (most notably
Delaware Gen. Corp. Law § 102(b)(7)) that authorize the abolition or limitation of due care liability by charter provision.0'0 Arguably, the message of these statutes is that some fundamental
deviations may violate public policy, unless legislatively authorized, given the jurisdiction's use of a legislative mandate for
prior major deviations. A similar example in an earlier era might
be the now universal state statutes authorizing corporate indemnification and insurance of directors and officers. Still, even if
this line of argument is accepted, it still does not tell us at what
point a particular deviation becomes so fundamental as to require legislative authorization. Another counter-argument is that
all these decisions were simply legislative attempts to resolve the
chaos created by judicial hostility to, and invalidation of, earlier
attempts at private ordering.
B.

Economic Objections

In principle, the derivative suit is an efficient answer to the
"free rider" problem.107 Because share ownership tends to be
dispersed in the public corporation, no single shareholder may
have an adequate incentive to undertake the costs necessary to
monitor management or to enforce its duties to the corporation.
After all, a million dollar loss to the corporation represents only
a thousand dollar loss to a one percent shareholder who will thus
105If the only concern were that shareholders might be unfairly surprised by a midstream change, the unanimity requirement of N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 620(b) is suflicient
to deal with this concern; nonetheless, section 620(c) adds the additional requirement
that the shares not be traded. Probably, the concern here is that newly formed companies could be taken public by promoters without shareholders understanding the special
restrictions on their shares. This concern applies equally to all important deviations from
the prevailing common law rules.
100

See note 10 supra.

For a fuller discussion of this problem as it applies to class and derivative litigation, see Coffee, supra note 78.
107
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have little incentive to restore this corporate loss when ninetynine percent of the benefit will accrue to his fellow shareholders.
Only if such a shareholder can equitably tax his fellow shareholders for his litigation costs can we expect adequate private
enforcement, even if the legal duties are optimally framed and
the likelihood of success on the merits is nearly certain. The derivative suit achieves this equitable proration of costs (and in
effect thereby taxes the free rider) by requiring the corporation
to reimburse the successful litigant for his reasonable attorneys'
fees. Historically, the successful plaintiff's attorney could expect
to receive twenty to twenty-five percent of the total recovery.108
In contrast, in arbitration, fee awards are typically more discretionary.109 As a result, although the plaintiff's attorney who
undertakes such cases serves in effect as a bounty hunter, arbitration's discretionary approach to fee shifting denies him the
incentive necessary to make this system of entrepreneurial law
enforcement work. Moreover, in arbitration, the plaintiff may
face liability for the defendants' costs and legal fees. 110 Because
these costs will typically be higher, there is potentially a forbidding disincentive here, which could be deliberately manipulated
by the draftsmen of such a charter provision.
Still another problem with arbitration is that it does not
yield legally relevant precedents.""' Litigation has third party ef-

"I For empirical surveys that reach this finding, see Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CORP.L. 267, 334-38, 345-47, 353 (1978);
Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions - Hornstein Revisited, 6 U. Ricm L REv. 259, 273-75, 281 (1972).
11" Many state arbitration statutes forbid or severely limit the award of attorneys'
fees. Section 10 of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides that "unless otherwise [agreed),
the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel
fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration shall be paid as provided in the award
...." Some state courts have read this language to bar fee awards even when the underlying liability statute mandates a fee award. See, e.g., Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis of
New England, Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 401 N.E.2d 839 (1980).
,11Typically, the arbitration agreement will authorize the arbitration panel to allocate the panel's fees as the panel deems appropriate. Yet, if a corporate charter provision
could authorize arbitration, there seems no legal obstacle to requiring the losing side to
pay the winning sides' legal expenses; the result is the British rule on fee shifting, and
this would amount to a substantial deterrent to the filing of class or derivative actions,
given the asymmetric stakes facing the plaintiff's attorney. See Coffee, supra note 78.
"I Arbitration also minimizes publicity because the proceedings can be conducted
in private; in contrast, evidence admitted at trial cannot be withheld from the press, at
least absent extraordinary circumstances. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 US. 20
(1984). Defenders of corporate privacy will see this as an advantage, while those who
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fects, and desirably so, because the legal precedents thereby generated guide others. Precedents are in this light a positive externality, which may justify the fact that society subsidizes the
public costs of litigation. Absent new precedents, the law's
evolution stops, and a static body of case law becomes regressive
as new conditions and problems appear. Still, for the immediate
future, the risk seems small that arbitration will be universally
adopted and, in the interim, a steady supply of precedents will
continue to be generated in cases involving firms that did not
opt for arbitration.
Some will advance an even broader political objection to
private ordering. The purpose of legal remedies, they might argue, is to subject the corporation to public accountability and
external monitoring - namely, the sunlight of public disclosure
in order to foster responsibility to other constituencies. For purposes of this Article, I would prefer to sidestep the issue of
whether public disclosure is always a virtue and corporate privacy always a vice. Yet, whatever view is taken, private ordering
can accommodate it, by specifying some level of press access and
public disclosure with respect to the proceeding.
IV.

AN EVALUATION: THE NEED FOR QUALITY CONSTRAINTS ON
OPTING-OUT

The foregoing survey has noted some of the legal rules that
courts have had to fashion to make the derivative action work.
Few, if any, would claim, however, that the result is an optimal
remedy on which private ordering could not improve. The point
of this survey is not that the common law is efficient, but rather
that any internal contracting process that sought to design a
privatized substitute for the derivative action would have to
write an extremely detailed contract and would have to develop
and rely upon largely untested procedures. Such a process entails very high information costs for investors and is subject to
opportunistic manipulation by managers at a variety of low visibility junctures. For each procedural stage that any private contract must address (for example, the rules relating to notice,
standing, approval of settlements, attorneys' fees, prohibitions of

believe, as does Justice Brandeis, that "sunlight is the best disinfectant," will think
otherwise.
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collusive settlements, the role of the board and distinctions between direct and derivative actions), small differences in technical language could mean the difference between an effective and
an illusory remedy. It may not be worth the market's time to
monitor these differences closely in advance of a particular
transaction or event that gives them significance. Moreover, because management has little incentive to subject itself to litiga'tion in any form, we should expect that it will exploit its de
facto control over the process of formulating amendments to the
corporation's charter and bylaws. It can do this both because
high information costs shelter it from an adverse market reaction and because its own compensation tends not to be closely
tied to the firm's stock price in any event.
These reasons would probably lead "consensualists" to favor
a rule forbidding "contracting out," both in this procedural area
as well as in substantive law areas. At most, they might accept
the idea of an arbitration remedy in the close corporation context (which, I agree, is the most likely setting for its initial development, given the potential cost savings it may afford the
smaller firm). Stil, a compromise is possible that falls somewhere between the positions of the contractarians and the consensualists. Put simply, this compromise is to permit only a limited and quality-constrained form of "contracting out." If the
subject matter of corporate law is too complex to have confidence in private ordering - that is, if we expect shareholders to
be "rationally apathetic" either because the information costs
are too high or the expected benefits to diversified shareholders
are too low - we could limit the range of choice by formulating
model provisions that corporations could adopt knowing in advance that courts would enforce them. The theory here is simply
that model provisions reduce both the transaction costs and uncertainty associated with relational contracts.11 2 Section 7.17 is
one example of such a provision; an even better known example
is the ABA's Model Debenture Indenture."' More generally,
112 For the view that standard form terms reduce uncertainty, see Goetz & Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1095-1100 (1981).
n1 AhmcAN BAR FOUNDATMON, CoW&zMAr
s ON INDENTURES (1971). The utility of

such model form provisions drafted by a reliable body has been recognized by the courts.

See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983).
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stock exchange rules have mandated equal voting rights among
common shareholders, annual audit requirements, and restrictions on certain takeover defensive tactics.1 14 From these sources
- ALI, ABA, the major stock exchanges - standard form contractual provisions would acquire a judicial gloss further reducing uncertainty.
Consider then a set of model arbitration procedures developed after intensive study by the ABA or ALI and approved in
more general terms by the New York Stock Exchange for its
listed companies. The SEC would also have a failsafe role under
its responsibility for approving amendments to stock exchange
rules.1 15 Given such multiple review, it seems overly cynical in
my judgment to insist that the resulting model form provisions
would significantly prejudice stockholder interests.
Thius, the compromise I would propose requires neither that
we swallow whole the rhetoric of private ordering nor insist upon
the unrealistic constraint of unanimous consent as a precondition to contracting out; rather, what I would recommend might
be termed "quasi-private ordering." Put simply, where major deviations from the traditional norms of corporate governance are
to be adopted - such as either a ceiling on due care liability, or
an arbitration provision that would foreclose access to the courts
- the corporation should be required to sustain the burden of
proving that the amendment was not against public policy. Elusive as this public policy standard is, it would mean showing
that the provision was not vulnerable to opportunistic manipulation. Generally, the corporation could meet this standard by
adopting a model provision draft by a representative group, such
as the ABA or ALI. In effect, opting out should be limited to a
choice among quality-controlled alternatives. Section 7.17 illustrates such a model provision on which a court might rely if approved by shareholders.

114 For a general overview of the scope of stock exchange rules, see Comment, Stock
Exchange Listing Agreements as a Vehicle for Corporate Governance, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1427 (1981).
11 Under section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)
(1982), the SEC is authorized to "abrogate, add to, and delete from . . . the rules of a
self-regulatory organization . . . as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to
insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization. . . or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this Chapter." The SEC has recently asserted this power in
the "one share, one vote" controversy by promulgating Proposed Rule 19c-4.
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This reliance on model provisions would not be the exclusive means of satisfying this burden (for example, unanimous
consent should also suffice), but in these other cases, the burden
should be on the proponents of the departure to show that the
modification was prompted by unforeseen new circumstances. In
effect, this carries forward section 89(D) of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts to relational contracts, such as the corporation. A more permissive standard should apply to provisions in
the original certificate of incorporation, but in the case of
amendments this burden should be a substantial one in the case
of major deviation, at least when the provision seemingly exposes shareholders to a risk of managerial opportunism.
Predictably, some will reply that the limited menu my proposal affords shareholders infringes on their autonomy and depends too heavily on the fortuitous availability of previously
prepared model provisions. Yet, the desire to undertake a major
deviation from the traditional rules of corporate governance
arises relatively infrequently and usually in a collective shift as
the result of some exogenous change or event, such as the recent
perceived liability crisis. Thus, it should not overtax the resources of our respected legal institutions to undertake the task
of studying and preparing such model provisions.
My perspective can usefully be contrasted here with that of
the contractarians. They see statutory corporate law as a model
form from which shareholders may depart at will. With them, I
recognize that "off-the-rack" rules may not fit all sizes or shapes
of corporations, but unlike them I acknowledge the legitimacy of
the consensualists' concern about special tailoring: that the tailor will cut the cloth to serve the interests of those who pay him
i.e., corporate management. Nonetheless, it is a false dichotomy to see the choice as all or nothing. The intermediate position is to develop a multiplicity of model forms, all carrying a
reputable brand name.
To be sure, when there are multiple brands to choose from,
it will be management, not the shareholders, who will probably
make that choice. Opportunism in the choice of brands is to be
expected, just as it also occurs in the choice of the jurisdiction of
incorporation. Still, so long as we trust the label, as I believe
most of us would in the case of model provisions drafted or approved by the major stock exchanges or the ALI, the magnitude
of any loss caused by managerial discretion to choose among
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quality brands seems in all probability to be small. In all likelihood, any provision adopted by such a body will be more balanced and sensible than many of the recent corporate law
amendments that have been hurriedly rushed through unsuspecting legislatures over the last two years. To sum up, private
ordering works best when the choice is between quality brands
and worst when the customer confronts the door-to-door salesman. Social experiments with contracting out should begin with
the development of more quality brands.
Lest my meaning be misconstrued, I should emphasize that
I do not think a court must defer to any model charter provision
that carries the reputational capital of some bar association.
Rather, I suggest that judicial inquiry should focus on the central questions: (1) Does the provision represent a bargain that
we can credibly believe rational shareholders might strike among
themselves or with managers and the other participants in the
corporation?; (2) Does the substituted or limited remedy fail of
its essential purpose?; (3) Is any clearly expressed legislative
policy violated?; and (4) Can shareholders price the departure or
does it involve risks that are too uncertain for the pricing mechanism to work without creating unproductive uncertainty? Opting out then needs to be quality constrained, but neither forbidden nor blindly accepted.
To sum up this debate in a slogan, the contractarians advise
you to trust the price; the consensualists, to trust nothing. I submit there is a sensible compromise: Trust the brand name, not
the price! Informed shoppers look at the label, and so might informed courts.

